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A Trip Through the Looking Glass -Asserting the
Right to Limit Liability in Admiralty
Alfred S. Pelaez
I. INTRODUCTION
For more than a century the admiralty has permitted vessel owners
to limit their exposure to certain liabilities to the after the occurrence
value of the vessel and its pending freight.1 And, for nearly as long, a
vessel owner has been permitted to assert this right either by filing a
Complaint for Limitation of Liability in a federal district court or by
setting forth the right to limit as a defense to an action commenced
against him or his vessel. Supplemental Rule F carries forward the
prior practice.2 It does not, however, provide answers to all problems
that can arise when a vessel owner seeks to assert the right to limit. It
is the purpose of this article to deal with two of those problems: the
timely commencement of a limitation proceeding by a vessel owner;
and the ability of a vessel owner to safely assert limitation as a
defense to an action commenced against him. While such endeavors
seem simple enough, case law and the applicable statutes and Rule
make clear that all may not be as it appears.
II. TIME WITHIN WHICH COMPLAINT MUST BE FILED
The most common manner of asserting a right to limit is to file a
complaint in the appropriate United States district court.3 Supplemen-
EDIToR's NOTE: This article will appear in 7A J. MOORE & A. PELAEZ, FEDERAL PRACTICE
11 F.02-.03 (2d ed. 1981). The author is Professor of Law at Duquesne University School of
Law. B.A., J.D., University of Pittsburgh; LL.M., Yale University.
1. The Limitation of Liability Act was enacted in 1851. Act of March 3, 1851, ch. 43,
§§ 1-7, 9 Stat. 635-36 (current version at 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-195 (1976)).
Prior to enactment of the American statute, limitation had become a prominent
feature of the maritime law of most seafaring nations. Our courts, however, refused to
judicially implement the concept. See The Rebecca, 20 F. Cas. 373 (D. Me. 1831) (No. 11,
619).
2. The 1966 unification of admiralty and civil procedures was made possible only by
the creation of special provisions applicable to the unique facets of the admiralty. These
provisions, entitled "Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims," are
appended to and made a part of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Supplemental Rule
F deals with limitation of liability. FED. R. Civ. P. F (Supp.). For the text of the rule, see
7A J. MOORE & A. PELAEZ. FEDERAL PRACTICE I F.01[1] (2d ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as
MOORE & PELAEz]. For commentary on the other supplemental rules, see id. 11
A.01[11-E.17[2].
3. It has always been permissible to assert the right to limit liability as a defense to
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tal Rule F(1) provides that such a complaint must be filed by the party
seeking the right to limit "[n]ot later than six months after his receipt
of a claim in writing."4 This provision modifies the Supreme Court Ad-
miralty Rule it superseded, 5 and closely tracks the 1936 amendment to
the Limitation Act which provides that "[t]he vessel owner, within six
months after a claimant shall have given to or filed with such owner
written notice of claim, may petition a district court of the United
States of competent jurisdiction for limitation of liability . *."..8
Failure to comply with a provision of the procedural rules is non-
jurisdictional in nature and may be overlooked by the court for com-
an action commenced against the shipowner. Although that method undoubtedly yet re-
mains, it is not altogether clear when such a defense can be effectively asserted and the
effect of such a defense. For a detailed discussion of limitation by answer, see text at part
Ill infra.
4. FED. R. Civ. P. F(1) (Supp.), reprinted in MOORE & PELAEZ. supra note 2, F.01[1].
Neither superseded Sup. Ct. Adm. R. 51, promulgated in 1948, nor its 1920
predecessor, contained a specific limitation period as to when the Petition to Limit Liabil-
ity had to be filed. For a discussion of the prior practice, see In re Southern S.S. Co.,
132 F. Supp. 316, 320 (D. Del. 1955). For the text of the former rules, see MOORE &
PELAEZ. supra note 2, .30.
The Joint Committee of the Comit6 Maritime International and Limitation of Liabil-
ity has recommended to the Maritime Law Association of the United States that Sup-
plemental Rule F(1) be revised to read that: "Not later than six months after any distinct
occasion which may give rise to a claim, any party seeking to limit may file a complaint...
for Limitation of Liability pursuant to such Act .... Report of the Joint Comm. of the
Comit6 Maritime International and the Comm. on Limitation of Liability of the Maritime
Law Ass'n of the United States, Doc. No. 619, May 4, 1979, at 7084. In commenting on the
proposed revision, the Committee said: "The six months time limit is revised to run from
the 'distinct occasion which may give rise to a claim' instead of from receipt of a claim in
writing as at present." Id. at 7081. That such a revision will not solve all problems is il-
lustrated by In re Southern S.S. Co., 132 F. Supp. 316 (D. Del. 1955). The court stated
that:
This limitation of time, viz., six months, clearly had to have a beginning point so
that it could be measured with exactness. The damages to or loss of a vessel would
not necessarily be an appropriate time for that purpose for such damage or loss
might not be able to be proven at all or be subject to divergent testimony. It seems
not improbable that the time of service of a written notice of claim was adopted as
a time as to which there could be no doubt and from which the statutory period of
six months could be definitely determined.
Id. at 319-20.
5. See the discussion in note 4 supra.
6. Act of June 5, 1936, ch. 521, § 3, 49 Stat. 1480 (amending Act of March 3, 1851,
ch.43, § 4, 9 Stat. 635) (current version at 46 U.S.C. § 185 (1976)). Prior to the 1936 amend-
ment to the Limitation Act there was no time limitation for commencing a limitation pro-
ceeding. See The Fred Smartley, Jr., 108 F.2d 603 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 683
(1940), where the court stated: "Prior to the statute of 1936, there was no time limit for
filing the petition for limitation of liability. The owner might wait until after judgment
was had against him." Id. at 607.
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pelling and equitable reasons.' However, it has been held that the word
"6may" in the statute "has been construed to mean 'must.' "" And, rely-
ing upon such authority, one commentator has asserted that, "[a]s far
as the owner is concerned, the timely filing of a complaint and posting
or offering to post security are jurisdictional requirements . ... I
However, the Supreme Court has never directly held that a failure to
abide by the statutory time period creates a jurisdictional bar to the
limitation action, and courts have permitted actions after statutes of
limitation have run in numerous other instances, including some of a
maritime nature. Thus, it is at least arguable that a delay occasioned
through no negligence or fault of the owner, or one resulting from
some deed or misdeed on the part of a claimant, will not preclude the
late filing of a limitation complaint. Moreover, and most importantly, it
is arguable that a stipulation entered into between the claimant and
the owner extending the time within which to file a limiation complaint
can be enforced.10 If the six month time period and the security re-
7. See In re Canada S.S. Lines, Ltd., 93 F. Supp. 549, 553 (N.D. Ohio 1950), holding
that the now superseded Supreme Court Admiralty Rules providing for limitation of
liability were procedural and not jurisdictional in nature.
It is illustrative to note that, prior to the 1948 amendment to the limitation rules, the
prevailing practice was to permit claimants to file claims after the time limitation pro-
vided in the rules for the filing of such claims-a practice that clearly indicated the time
limitation was not intended to be jurisdictional in nature. Since 1948, the applicable rule
has provided that the period may be extended at the discretion of the trial judge. See
Jappinen v. Canada S.S. Lines, Ltd., 417 F.2d 189 (6th Cir. 1969); Meyer y'. New England
Fish Co., 136 F.2d 315 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 771 (1943).
8. Cantey v. McLain Line, Inc., 40 F. Supp. 887, 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1941). See also Stan-
dard Wholesale Phosphate & Acid Works, Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 107 F.2d 373 (4th Cir.
1939), where the court stated:
The right of the owner of a vessel to limit liability is wholly statutory in the
United States .... To avail himself of this right granted by the statute the owner
must bring himself within the terms fixed by the statute. While the purpose of the
statute is to protect and encourage maritime commerce and, while statutes of this
character are to be liberally construed, this liberality of construction cannot be ex-
tended so that express conditions laid down by the statute itself are waived or ig-
nored. The statute clearly and expressly requires as a condition to the filing of the
petition that it must be filed "within six months after a claimant shall have given to
or filed with such owner written notice of claim."
Id. at 376 (citation omitted).
For additional authority, see Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. Abel, 533 F.2d 1001 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 858 (1976); In re American M.A.R.C., Inc., 224 F. Supp. 573
(S.D. Cal. 1963).
9. Thede, Statutory Limitations (Other Than Harter and COGSAJ of Carrier's
Liability to Cargo-Limitation of Liability and the Fire Statute, 45 TUL. L. REV. 959, 974
(1971).
10. It should be emphasized that there is no authority to the effect that a stipulation
extending the time within which a limitation complaint can be filed will be given judicial
cognizance. Moreover, since such a stipulation could arguably affect other claimants who
1981
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quirements of the Limitation Act are deemed jurisdictional in nature,
any stipulation to extend the time or to alter the type of security re-
quired would be ineffective. Yet, the effect of such a conclusion could
be contrary to an expressed purpose of the admiralty, that of
facilitating the uninterrupted flow of maritime commerce, and also an-
tagonistic to the concurrent judicial goal of encouraging settlement of
claims that otherwise must be disposed of in costly and time consum-
ing judicial proceedings. Thus, while the prudent vessel owner seeking
to limit liability will scrupulously comply with the six month limitation
period, it is far from certain whether a failure to abide by that
restraint will in all instances preclude the commencement of a limita-
tion proceeding."
Both the statute and the Supplemental Rule make clear that, for
limitation purposes, the critical date is not the time of the occurrence
giving rise to the limitation action, but the date on which proper notice
of an intent to claim damages is submitted.12 In this regard, it is ap-
propriate to note that the Rule and the statute use slightly different
language."3 Supplemental Rule F(1) commences the six month period
have not yet filed their claims, see text accompanying note 47 infra, there is a strong
argument against the enforceability of such a stipulation, at least insofar as other
claimants who are not parties to the stipulation may be affected. Thus, while it is believed
that it would be desirable to enforce such stipulations at least among those parties con-
senting thereto, it must be emphasized that a vessel owner delaying the filing of a limita-
tion complaint on the strength of such a stipulation acts at his own considerable peril.
11. It should be noted that the very fact that Supplemental Rule F(1) uses language
different from the language in 46 U.S.C. § 185 (1976) is an indication that the drafters of
the Rule, and ostensibly the Supreme Court which promulgated them, did not believe the
statutory requirements to be of a jurisdictional nature. But see Grand Bahama Petroleum
Co. v. Canadian Transp. Agencies, Ltd., 450 F. Supp. 447 (W.D. Wash. 1978), where the
court stated:
The Supreme Court does not promulgate rules in the same manner it decides ques-
tions of law. When engaged in rule-making, the Court acts only in an administrative
and not a judicial capacity. The federal rules of procedure "are the work of very
capable advisory committees. Those committees, not the Court, wrote the rules."
While the Court certainly considers the constitutionality of a rule recommeded by a
committee, it is not possible for its members to anticipate every constitutional ob-
jection. The Court itself has recognized this. "The fact that this Court promulgated
the rules as formulated and recommended by the Advisory Committee does not
foreclose consideration of their validity, meaning or consistency."
Id. at 450 (footnotes omitted).
12. For a recommendation that the Rule be amended to make the date of the occur-
rence the significant event for commencement of the six month period, see note 4 supra.
13. It is not altogether clear by what authority the Rule can deviate from the
statutorily provided procedures for initiating limitation proceedings. Yet, the admiralty
has a history of promulgating procedural rules that deviate from statutorily provided re-
quirements and, in some instances, alter or even lessen the statutory duties. For an il-
lustration of this, see FED. R. Civ. P. E(5)(a) (Supp.), reprinted in MOORE & PELAEZ. supra
note 2, E.01[1]. The Rule provides that the owner of arrested or attached property can
Vol. 19:265268
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with the owner's "receipt of a claim in writing."' The act triggering
the six month period in the statute is the claimant's having "given to
or filed with such owner written notice of the claim.'"5 The two provi-
sions are not necessarily identical. It is at least arguable that notice
can be "given to" the vessel owner by depositing a properly stamped
and addressed letter in the mail, with the risk of loss or misdirection
placed upon the vessel owner. However, the Rule's requirement that
the six month period be triggered by "receipt" of that notice leaves
less room for application of a maritime version of the Mail Box Rule or
any other method of constructive communication of notice. Similarly, it
is not clear whether the triggering date for a mailed letter that is ac-
tually received should be the date of mailing, the date of post-mark, or
the date the letter is actually received by the vessel owner. While the
Rule seems clearly to set as the relevant date the vessel owner's
receipt, regardless of the method of transmittal employed by the claim-
ant, it could not extend the statutorily set time-frame if that time-
frame is deemed a jurisdictional requirement. Thus, while it is believed
that a more logical and perhaps workable answer would be to com-
mence the running of the six month period from the date the owner
receives the notice of claim, it is not certain that this logical approach
secure the release of that property by posting a special bond in "an amount sufficient to
cover the amount of the plaintiff's claim fairly stated with accrued interest and costs .... "
This has been construed as permitting bonds much lower than double the amount claimed
by the plaintiff. On the other hand, 28 U.S.C. § 2464 (1976) has long required that the
bond be double the amount of the plaintiffs claim. For an illustration of the judicial foot-
work required to uphold validity of a rule that seems patently to conflict with a
legislative mandate, see The Lotosland, 2 F. Supp. 42 (E.D.N.Y. 1933). See also MOORE &
PELAEZ. supra note 2, E.13[1].
It must be emphasized that there are no judicial decisions indicating that the practice
approved in Supplemental Rule F(1) does in fact deviate from the procedures outlined in
46 U.S.C. § 185 (1976). The language could, however, lead to such a conclusion. If there is
deemed to be a conflict, it can at least be argued that following either the procedure in
the Rule or that in the statute will be sufficient, with The Lotosland cited as analogous
authority. Since failure to comply with whichever procedure is ultimately deemed
authoritative could deprive an owner of the benefits of the Limitation Act, it is hoped
that either both procedures will be judicially adopted or that, despite the differences of
language, the statute and the rule ultimately will be construed as having the same mean-
ing.
Interestingly, the recommendation submitted to the Maritime Law Commission to
make the date of the occurrence the triggering event for running of the six month period
asks only that the Rule be changed. The recommendation nowhere indicates that an
amendment to the statute will also be required. See note 4 supra. Perhaps this is il-
lustrative of a maritime habit of ignoring statutes when they conflict with industry prac-
tices!
14. FED. R. Civ. P. F(1) (Supp.) (emphasis added).
15. 46 U.S.C. § 185 (1976) (emphasis added).
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squares with the statutory language or with any jurisdictional stric-
tures that may be read into the Limitation Act.
A second question that has remained unanswered is what con-
stitutes receipt of a claim in writing. By whom must that notice be
received, or to whom must it be given, or with whom must it be filed
to commence the six month period? Clearly, receipt of a claim by the
individual owner of the vessel against which the claim may be
asserted, or receipt of such notice by the chief executive of a corporate
owner, would suffice. But, it is not clear how far down the ladder
notice can be delivered and yet trigger the running of the six month
period. The problem is made even more complicated because vessel
owners-whether individuals or corporate -frequently engage agents
and brokers to handle and manage their ventures in foreign ports, and
because it may be far more expedient to deliver the notice to masters
or officers of particular vessels than to send notice to very distant
owners or executives, and to owners whose identity may be obscured
by the use of complex and interlocking -corporate forms created to
meet a host of tax, labor, and other unrelated problems. An obvious,
although not necessarily complete, analogy is found by reference to
that category of officials whose notice of a defect is sufficient to pre-
vent the vessel owner from limiting liability for losses caused by such
defects. 6 It would seem necessary to follow that if notice of a defect by
such a person is sufficient to take away the right to limit, delivery of a
notice of claim to such a person is sufficient to trigger the running of
the six month period. There is, however, no clear-cut judicial authority
so holding; and, even if that statement should prove accurate, it is not
axiomatic that the converse will also be true-ie., that delivery of a
notice of claim to a person outside the ambit of the preceding group of
officers or officials will be insufficient to trigger the statutory time
limitation. The obvious answer might well be that delivery of notice to
any person or entity who is reasonably likely, because of the nature of
his association with the owner, to make suie it is expeditiously
delivered to the appropriate decision-making person or entity should
suffice. It must be emphasized, however, that there are few judicial
guidelines to this problem other than the fundamental concepts of
16. The Limitation of Liability Act permits the vessel owner to limit liability for
losses occurring "without the privity or knowledge of such owner or owners." 46 U.S.C. §
183(a) (1976). A whole body of law has grown from that phrase in order to determine
whether knowledge by a particular person or entity is deemed the knowledge of the
owner, and it is today clear that the knowledge of certain officials or employees will be
deemed the equivalent of knowledge by the owner for limitation purposes. See generally
G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 877-98 (2d ed. 1975) [hereinafter
cited as GILMORE & BLACK].
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fairness and due process." Thus, until further judicial or legislative
clarification, one providing other than direct notice to the individual
owner or to a high ranking officer of the corporate owner may not be
certain that he has triggered the running of the six month period.
An analogous problem is whether the six month period will com-
mence with actual receipt of the claim or notice by the owner, even
though it is not received directly from the claimant but is instead for-
warded by some person or entity not included within the term "owner"
or is otherwise indirectly communicated to the owner. 8 The statute
17. If the notice requirement is to be afforded a common-sense interpretation rather
than be treated as a technical snare for the unwary, it might be well to consider the
degree of sophistication and experience a particular claimant, vessel owner, or "agent"
possesses. That some courts have refused to consider such facts, however, is illustrated
by The Belleville, 35 F. Supp. 934 (E.D.N.Y. 1940); see notes 32-37 and accompanying text
infra.
18. It is far from clear what will constitute a sufficient writing to commence running
of the six month period; see note 31 infra. The problem is complicated when the notice,
even though at one stage in writing, was not in writing at all stages of its transmittal
and/or is indirectly communicated to the owner. Some illustrations may prove helpful:
It is conceivable that the claimant could initially direct the writing to one not in priv-
ity with the owner. The original recipient could then (a) forward the original writing to
the owner or one in a sufficiently close position to the owner to be deemed in privity with
him; or (b) orally notify the owner that such writing has been received, and of the con-
tents; or (c) notify the owner by a separate writing that an original writing has been
received, and of the contents. Would the notice in any or all of these situations be suffi-
cient to satisfy the requirements of the Rule and/or statute and, if so, from what time?
Moreover, it is conceivable that a claim initially made orally could become written
before it was ultimately transferred to the owner. Thus, the claimant could orally notify
one not in a position of privity to the owner of the claim and the latter could reduce the
claim's contents to writing and transmit it to the owner. Would that suffice? And, once
more, from what point would the notice, if deemed sufficient, be effective?
Additionally, it is not inconceivable that a claimant could attempt to notify an owner
whose address-or, perhaps, even whose identity-is not known by publishing the claim
and a description of the occurrence from which it arose in a newspaper. Would that suf-
fice if the owner receives actual notice of that fact? Moreover, would an action com-
menced by an arrest or attachment of the owner's property, and subsequent publication of
that fact, be deemed sufficient notice to the owner to commence running of the six month
period even though the owner may never be actually apprised of that fact until after the
running of the six months? The significance of the last question is that, even though the
in rem or quasi in rem actions cannot result in an in personam judgment against the
owner, his failure to limit liability if the publication is deemed sufficient notice to him
could subject him to further in personam liability from other claims arising out of the
same occurrence if notice by one claimant is sufficient to start the running of the six
month period for every other claim that can arise from the same occurrence. In this
regard, see The Grasselli Chem. Co. No. 4, 20 F. Supp. 394 (S.D.N.Y. 1937). See notes
47-50 and accompanying text infra.
There are, as might be expected, no cases answering any of these questions. The il-
lustrations do, however, point out that a multitude of circumstances can arise which are
not clearly answered by either the Rule or the statute and which have a dramatic impact
upon the rights of both claimants and ship owners.
1981
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provides the vessel owner with a six month period "after a claimant
shall have given to or filed with" him a written notice of claim.'9 Sup-
plemental Rule F(1) provides only that the limitation proceeding must
be commenced within six months after the owner's "receipt of a claim
in writing."2 While it is arguable that an indirect communication of the
claim or notice would not be sufficient to toll the statutory period in
that it was not the claimant who gave or filed the notice with the
owner, it is believed that such an interpretation would be unsound and
would only add to the numerous, and frequently unnecessary, subtle
distinctions that abound in and often plague the admiralty. What is
perceived as necessary in both the statute and the Rule is that the
owner be made aware in writing that a person has suffered some loss
or injury as the result of a maritime occurrence and that he be given
ample opportunity to elect to use the limitation process to limit ex-
posure to that claim and to other claims which might arise out of the
same occurrence. It should make no difference that the notice, if ade-
quate to fulfill the Rule or statutory requirements, was not directly
communicated to the owner by the claimant but, instead, was in-
directly communicated.
In order to trigger the commencement of the six month period the
Rule requires that the owner receive "a claim in writing,"'" and the
statute requires that the owner be given "written notice of claim."22
While the two phrases are theoretically subject to different interpreta-
tions, there are, happily, no indications in the decisions that this is in
fact the case, and common sense would preclude the fashioning of dif-
ferent tests for those proceeding under the Rule and those pursuing
the statutory limitation procedure.' Even if the requirements are
treated as synonymous, however, it must be determined whether a
particular notice is sufficient to commence running of the six month
period.
It should be emphasized at the outset that the purpose of the 1936
amendment to the Limitation Act was not to create snares for the un-
wary claimant, but to prevent the previous practice of permitting an
owner to seek limitation of liability for the first time at later stages of
judicial proceedings -including after judgment was rendered against
him. Thus, as noted by the Fourth Circuit in The Fred Smartley, Jr.:24
19. 46 U.S.C. § 185 (1976).
20. FED. R. Civ. P. F(1) (Supp.).
21. Id.
22. 46 U.S.C. § 185 (1976).
23. This assumes that the requirements of the Rule and the statute differ,
which-unlike the situation with special bonds, see note 13 supra-has never been held to
be the case with limitation procedures.
24. 108 F.2d 603 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 683 (1940).
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"That statute ... amended R.S. § 4285 so as to require petitions for
limitation of liability to be filed within six months after the filing of a
written notice of claim, the purpose of the amendment being to require
the owner to act promptly if he desires to limit his liability."' Clearly,
compelling an early decision as to whether limitation is desired has the
comriendable effect of preventing an owner from first dipping his toe
into the trial waters to see precisely how he fares and then seeking to
mute the effect of a larger than expected verdict by use of a device
that-though expensive to engage-was previously available to limit
his exposure. Moreover, forcing an early resort to limitation may have
the salutary effect of minimizing the likelihood of several judicial pro-
ceedings, with the attendant waste of judicial resources, to do what
could have been accomplished in a single proceeding." Thus, it seems
evident that it was game-playing and abuses by owners that the
amendment sought to curb, and not tactics employed by claimants.7
Notwithstanding the clear evidence of legislative intent, there exist
several decisions requiring the claimant's notice to do more than simply
apprise the owner of the occurrence and of the claimant's injury, thus
enabling the owner to conduct an investigation sufficient to ascertain
whether it would be feasible and desirable to commence a limitation
proceeding.'
Existing case law makes clear that, while the notice need be in no
particular form, it must "inform the owner of claimant's intention to
25. Id. at 607 (emphasis added). Prior to 1936, an owner might wait until after judg-
ment was entered against him before seeking to limit liability, at least where the action
was commenced in a state court. See, e.g., Larsen v. Northland Transp. Co., 292 U.S. 20,
23-24 (1934). It is clear that this is no longer possible.
26. Commencement of a limitation proceeding where there are multiple claimants will
result in the staying of actions already commenced elsewhere, and the prohibition of new
actions based upon the same occurrence from being filed, thereby forcing all claimants to
intervene in the limitation proceeding and permitting the limitation court to resolve all
claims arising out of the occurrence.
27. That is not to say, however, that "game-playing" by claimants should-or
must-be condoned. Thus, notice by a single claimant of a claim so small as to discourage
detailed investigation given by one represented by an attorney who also represents one
or more others with far more substantial claims in the hope that the small claim will be
settled without investigation or commencement of a limitation proceeding, and that the
ultimate exposure of the owner will thereby be substantially increased, should also be
discouraged. See text accompanying notes 47-50 infra. It does not appear, however, that it
was this particular type of "game-playing" that the 1936 amendment was aimed toward
preventing, and the fear of that particular odious practice should in no way influence the
interpretation of the 1936 statute.
28. While it is believed that many of those decisions rest upon a weak foundation and
require more in the way of notice than it was the intention of the Congress to compel,
they undoubtedly represent the current status of the law and must not be ignored. For
cases illustrative of this point, see text accompanying notes 29-50 infra.
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look to the owner for damages."' Moreover, it has been held on more
than one occasion that filing a claim for compensation damages or
similar benefits is not sufficient notice to trigger running of the six
month period, because such claims are not the type that are subject to
limitation." Thus, the notice apparently must inform the owner of an
intention to look to him for damages in satisfaction of a limitable claim.
Exactly how precise such a notice must be has never been clearly ar-
ticulated. 1 However, in The Belleville32 the wife of an injured seaman
29. In re Anthony O'Boyle, Inc., 51 F. Supp. 430, 431 (S.D.N.Y. 1943). This decision
further clarifies that "[mlere notice or knowledge on the part of the owner of the accident
and injury is not sufficient," a statement found frequently in the cases.
30. See In re Spearin, Preston & Burrows, Inc., 190 F.2d 684 (2d Cir. 1951), where
the daughter of an injured worker notified the vessel owner that the worker had been in-
jured, and that she would look to the owner for his expenses. The owner had been making
payments under the Lohgshoreman's Act and, subsequently, the worker filed a Jones Act
action, alleging that he was a member of the crew of the vessel upon which he had been
injured. In holding that the shipowner could limit liability even though it attempted* to do
so more than six months after receipt of the initial notice, the court said:
Such authority as there is on the point supports the view that a notice which starts
the running of the six months' period must be notice of a claim of a kind subject to
limitation.... Luoma's daughter only claimed "expenses," a compensation claim not
subject to limitation .... Therefore, we conclude that petitioner complied with the
statute when it instituted the limitation proceeding within six months of ... the
date on which Luoma commenced proceedings in the New York State Court.
Id. at 686 (citations omitted). See also In re Hutchinson, 28 F. Supp. 519 (E.D.N.Y. 1938).
It is not always easy to ascertain what claims are subject to limitation and which
claims are not. See generally GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 16, at 846-50. If notice of any
limitable claim will work to trigger running of the six month period for all claims arising
out of the same occurrence, see text accompanying note 47 infra, it will be necessary for
the shipowner to ascertain early-on whether notice is in fact of a claim that is subject to
limitation. It would seem that where there is any doubt, prudent counsel whose client
stands much to gain from asserting limitation will err in favor of commencement of limita-
tion proceedings within six months of the initial notice even though there may be some
doubt as to whether the notice is of a limitable claim. However, if it is ultimately held
that attempts to limit prior to receipt of written notice of a limitable claim are ineffective,
such precautionary measures may be of no avail. See text accompanying note 58 infra.
31. It is evident that service of suit papers on behalf of an injured claimant is suffi-
cient to trigger running of the six month period, whether such papers are filed in a
jurisdiction where notice pleading is permitted or in a jurisdiction where the facts sur-
rounding the occurrence must be more fully set forth. See, e.g., The Belleville, 35 F. Supp.
934 (E.D.N.Y. 1940), where the court treated filing of the libel as the event which trig-
gered running of the six month period. In some state courts, however, suits can be com-
menced by filing a Praecipe for a Writ of Summons, which advises the defendant only
that an action has been commenced against him by the named plaintiff and provides no
details as to the nature of the occurrence giving rise to the action. The main purpose of
such a pleading is to toll the applicable statute of limitations. If the subsequently issued
Writ of Summons is not served upon the defendant shipowner, it can hardly be said to
constitute the type of notice that will trigger running of the six month period. If,
however, the writ is served upon the defendant, he can file a rule compelling the plaintiff
to file a complaint within twenty days. Receipt of such writ does inform the defendant of
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hospitalized as the result of a limitable claim' wrote to the vessel
owner reciting her husband's need for money and pay and stating
that she hoped, "I get what he is asking for."'' The court held that the
letter was "not such a notice as should toll the running of the
statutory period." If the court's conclusion is premised upon the fact
that the claimant-who performed both stevedoring and seaman type
services to the owner's vessel-began receiving benefits under the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act shortly after
the letter was sent, it can be justified as simply another of the fairly
numerous authorities providing that notice sufficient to trigger run-
ning of the six month period must be of a claim subject to limitation."
If, on the other hand, The Belleville is authority for the proposition
that an injured seaman informing the vessel owner of a limitable claim
must more precisely indicate he is making a claim against the owner,
the holding is most questionable. Requiring an injured party, who fre-
quently is far less knowledgeable than a vessel owner as to the in-
tricacies of limitation law, to more precisely set forth that which is
reasonably implied by the very fact of the letter does not square either
the identity of the plaintiff-claimant, and of the fact that he is being looked to for damages
of some sort. It does not, however, specifically advise him of the making of a limitable
claim and is thus not likely to be deemed the type of notice required to trigger running of
the six month period. It could be argued, however, that receipt of the writ enables a pru-
dent shipowner to investigate the nature of the claim-if, by no other means, by filing a
rule compelling the service of a complaint-and that in this regard the purpose of en-
abling the shipowner to investigate the claim has been fulfilled. What analogous prece-
dent there is indicates that such an argument is not likely to prove successful. See the
authorities cited in notes 29 & 30 supra.
32. 35 F. Supp. 934 (E.D.N.Y. 1940).
33. Even though the claim was subsequently determined to be one pursuant to the
Jones Act, and thus limitable, it is significant that the claimant also performed many
shoreside duties and that he did in fact receive benefits under the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act commencing shortly after the initial notice to the
employer. Thus, it is conceivable that the initial notice was deemed ineffective because it
did not make clear whether the claimant, who was in that nebulous area separating crew
members from longshoremen, sought compensation benefits-which are not subject to
limitation-or those types of damages that are subject to limitation. In short, it is not ab-
solutely clear whether a notice identical to that in The Belleville would have been deemed
ineffective by that court had the claimant been without doubt a member of the crew of
the vessel and, thus, unentitled to compensation benefits. It could be argued, however,
that even in the latter situation it is necessary for the seaman to make clear whether he
is seeking only maintenance and cure benefits, which many courts have said are not sub-
ject to limitation, or damages for injuries caused as a result of the vessel's unsea-
worthiness or the negligence of its owner, both of which are subject to limitation. If that
is so, perhaps even today a "Belleville-type notice" could be deemed too lacking in
specificity to trigger running of the six month period.
34. 35 F. Supp. at 935.
35. Id.
36. See notes 30 & 33 supra.
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with reality or with developing case law in analogous terrestrial
areas." Yet, The Belleville and cases similar to it continue to be used
as authority for the proposition that one possessing a limitable claim
must clearly articulate that he is looking to the vessel owner for
retribution if the letter is to satisfy the requirements of 46 U.S.C. §
185, as incorporated in Supplemental Rule F(1). How persuasive such
authorities will continue to be in this era when the Limitation Act is
no longer construed liberally in favor of the shipowner remains to be
seen, but it is hoped that any writing reasonably calculated to put the
vessel owner on notice that a claim might well be asserted should suf-
fice today. Illustrative of a loosening of the notice standards is In re
Allen N. Spooner & Sons, Inc.,' where a notice indicating that the
writer "may press a claim" was deemed sufficient to commence run-
ning of the six month period. That seems more in keeping with the
purpose of the amendment and with the realities of the situation.
It should be noted that, even though there appears to be a liberaliz-
ing trend in the notice requirement, oral notices will undoubtedly con-
tinue to be insufficient. In In re Hutchinson39 the court stated the then
prevailing rule as follows: "Mere knowledge of an accident or informa-
tion given orally by a third party or even by a claimant does not come
within the new restriction placed upon the remedy provided or right
given to a vessel owner."40 Since both the statute and the Supplemen-
tal Rule still require that the notice be in writing, and since there are
no judicial decisions indicating that oral notice or actual knowledge of
the occurrence will be sufficient to commence running of the six month
period, it must be assumed that the statement in In re Hutchinson yet
applies and has not been affected by the more liberal tendencies
toward claimants in the area of limitation. It remains to be ascer-
tained, however, whether conduct on the part of the vessel owner
leading the claimant to believe that more formal written notice will not
be required will constitute a waiver of the provision requiring that
37. See, e.g., Brakeman v. Potomac Ins. Co., 472 Pa. 66, 371 A.2d 193 (1977), holding
that the purpose of insurance policy provisions requiring prompt notice of an occurrence
within the scope of the policy "is to give the insurer an opportunity to acquire, through an
adequate investigation, full information about the circumstances of the case, on the basis
of which it can proceed to disposition, either through settlement or defense of the claim."
Id. at 74, 371 A.2d at 197. It can be argued that the "notice of claim" requirement in Sup-
plemental Rule F(1) and 46 U.S.C. § 185 (1976) is intended to fulfill the same function, and
a vessel owner who sits idly back after receiving even a most sketchy notice of claim and
makes no reasonable efforts to ascertain the nature of the claim does so at his own peril.
38. 148 F. Supp. 181 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), affl'd, 253 F.2d 584 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 358
U.S. 30 (1958).
39. 28 F. Supp. 519 (E.D.N.Y. 1938).
40. Id. at 520.
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notice be made in writing, or estop the vessel owner from asserting
that fact in opposition to a motion by the claimant that limitation is no
longer available. While the logical answer to that question is that one
who is wholly or partially responsible for the failure to provide the re-
quired notice should not be able to benefit from that failure, it could be
argued that the statutory requirement cannot be waived any more
than the six month period can be extended by stipulation-and there is
some indication that may be the case."1 It should be pointed out,
however, that the requirement of written notice is for the sole benefit
of the vessel owner. The six month period, while it undoubtedly
benefits claimants, also serves the purpose of preventing multiple law
suits where one might suffice and, in that respect, fulfills the broader
goal of judicial economy and the early resolution of claims. Thus, the
governmental interest which could arguably prevent extension of the
six month period is not present in situations involving a waiver of the
requirement of written notice. 2
Neither the statute nor the Supplemental Rule provide that the
identity of the claimant must be clearly set forth in the notice of claim
in order to trigger running of the six month period. There is, however,
at least one authority indicating that this may be a prerequisite. The
Ariel43 dealt with a fishing vessel that foundered and sank, resulting
in the death of all on board. Several months after the occurrence, an
attorney wrote to the owners advising them that he had "been re-
tained by the families of certain of the members of the crew of the
fishing boat Ariel to prosecute their claims for damages arising out of
the loss of their lives when that vessel foundered on September 21,
1938."" The trial judge thought the fact that the crew members whose
families the attorney represented had not been identified was suffi-
cient to invalidate the notice, stating:
I do not think that this letter is sufficient "notice of claim" to start the
running of the six month period. It merely states that the attorneys have
been retained "by the families of certain of the members of the crew;"
who these members of the crew were is not indicated, nor is there
anything to identify them with a fair degree of accuracy. The statute
41. See notes 9 & 10 supra.
42. If the analogy to terrestrial insurance law is adopted, it could be deemed incum-
bent upon a vessel owner receiving an oral notice to inform the claimant that written
notice is required to commence running of the six month period, and failure to provide
such notice might be a sufficient basis to estop the owner from subsequently asserting
that the notice was ineffective.
43. 30 F. Supp. 110 (S.D.N.Y. 1939), affd, 119 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1941).
44. Id. The libellants were the personal representatives of six deceased members of
the crew of the vessel. Id.
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should be given a reasonable interpretation ... but this means something
more than notice of claim from anonymous claimants.45
The result seems overly technical, especially since the name and ad-
dress of the attorney was clearly set forth and since he specifically re-
quested in the letter-notice that the owner "please communicate with
us concerning this matter."4 If the claimants remained "anonymous"
and unknown to the owners in such circumstances, it was by their own
design. Notice, clearly, is required; that it must be presented on a
silver platter is not so certain, The Ariel notwithstanding!
The reasoning of The Ariel is made all the more suspect if it is true
that notice by a single claimant is sufficient to commence running of
the six month period for all those whose claims arise out of the same
occurrence, even though some or all of the other claimants fail to pro-
vide the required written notice. At least one court has so held. In The
Grasselli Chemical Co. No. 447 the court, after reviewing the legislative
history of the Limitation Act, concluded:
My opinion is that the language of section 185, set in the background of
the legislation of 1936 relating to limitation proceedings, requires the con-
struction that a petition for limitation of liability must be filed within six
months after the first written notice shall have been given of a claim aris-
ing out of the particular accident or disaster in question. If the petition is
not so filed, the shipowner's privilege of limiting liability is lost entirely
in respect to all claims arising out of the accident or disaster."
In justifying that holding, the court observed:
This construction of the amendment works no apparent hardship on the
shipowner. As soon as the first written notice of claim is filed, the
shipowner has almost six months in which to investigate and determine if
any other claims, having merit and arising from the same accident or
disaster, are likely to be the subject of litigation. We may reasonably
assume that such an investigation would be made in any event. Further,
this point was before the Committee of the House ... when it was con-
sidering this bill. It may be concluded that the increase of the time within
which to file the petition from three months to six months met this objec-
tion in the opinion of Congress.'9
Professors Gilmore and Black deem this "a most unlikely construc-
tion" of the statute, noting that it would prevent a shipowner who is
notified of and settles a relatively small claim from subsequently peti-
tioning to limit much larger claims that may be asserted.' However,
45. Id. at 110-11 (citations omitted).
46. Id. at 110.
47. 20 F. Supp. 394 (S.D.N.Y. 1937).
48. Id. at 396.
49. Id. at 396-97.
50. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 16, at 861.
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notification of even a small claim should alert the shipowner to the oc-
currence and enable him to investigate the incident to ascertain if it is
likely to give rise to other claims. Since an undoubted purpose of the
1936 amendment seems to be to force an early decision as to whether
to seek limitation, it would be in keeping with that goal to compel the
shipowner to conduct the necessary investigation as soon as it is put
on notice of an occurrence that might warrant such action. Notice of a
small claim, no less than notice of a large claim, serves to alert the
vigilant shipowner. Thus, it is believed the approach of the court in
The Grasselli Chemical Co. No. 4 is sound and in keeping with the
policy of 46 U.S.C. § 185.
If notice from a single claimant is deemed sufficient to enable the
owner to investigate the numerous other "anonymous" claims which
might grow out of the same occurrence, it seems axiomatic that notice
from an attorney clearly identifying the occurrence, specifying that he
is filing a claim on behalf of six clients, and urging that the owner con-
tact him so that a resolution of the claims can be effectuated, should
have the same effect. Unless the purpose of the notice requirement is
to erect a barrier in the path of the claimant, and not to provide the
owner an adequate opportunity to conduct an investigation to ascer-
tain whether he desires to make use of the limitation procedures, deci-
sions like The Ariel should be disregarded.
It has been held that, for notice to be effective, it must be made by
one who is "a claimant under the Act."51 Since even The Ariel would
apparently permit notice to be made by an attorney on behalf of an
identified claimant, it must be assumed that notice by one standing in
a fiduciary or representative capacity to a claimant will be sufficient.
Moreover, it has been held that "[t]o say that the word 'claimant' as used
in the statute is limited to those usually authorized in admiralty to in-
itiate a libel against a vessel or other property, is far too narrow an in-
terpretation .... "52 Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit held that notice of a claim given by the parents of a
deceased claimant was sufficient even though the Ohio Death Act, pur-
suant to which any action would have had to be brought, required that
suit on that claim be brought by the properly appointed personal
representative of the decedent-which the parents were not. In
51. In re Hutchinson, 28 F. Supp. 519, 520 (E.D.N.Y. 1938).
52. Standard Wholesale Phosphate & Acid Works, Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 107 F.2d
373, 376 (4th Cir. 1939) (quoting The Main, 28 F. Supp. 578, 581 (D. Md. 1939)). It should be
emphasized, however, that the insurance company filing the claim was subrogated to the
rights of the injured insured and, under the applicable state law, was the one party who
could assert the claim. On those facts, the insurance company was deemed a claimant
within the scope of the Limitation Act.
53. In re Donnelly, 230 F.2d 169, 171 (6th Cir. 1956).
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reaching that common sense conclusion, the court noted that "to adopt
the position taken by the appellant [ship owner] would entail a very
narrow construction of the Act and would require obedience to form
rather than recognition of substance.""
Thus, while one must undoubtedly be a real party in interest to in-
stitute a maritime suit55 and, most probably, to file a claim in a limita-
tion proceeding, it seems probable that someone outside the ambit of
the real party in interest status may be capable of providing sufficient
notice to commence running of the six month period within which a
limitation complaint must be filed.
Clearly, the Limitation of Liability Act, whether construed liberally
or restrictively, was and remains intended to provide shipowners with
a measure of protection from certain losses that can exceed the value
of the vessel and its pending freight. Consequently, it would constitute
an unwarranted judicial interference with the legislative intent if the
Act were construed in such a manner as to effectively destroy that
remedy.' However, that does not mean that the notice of claims provi-
sions must be construed so as to give vessel owners the benefit of
every doubt. As stated by one court:
Because ... the statute is in derogation of the common law and abridges
the rights of a claimant to a full recovery of his damages, it is not to be
construed to interfere with the rights of claimants to a greater extent
than is necessary to fully and adequately effectuate the purpose of the
Act. 57
Written notice of a claim is clearly required to trigger commence-
ment of the six month period. Where such notice is sufficient to enable
the vessel owner to conduct an investigation within the six month
period to determine whether limitation is an attractive procedure, it
should be deemed effective, regardless of form and without concern for
technical niceties. The type of game-playing that has too frequently
surrounded the notice requirement in the past should no longer be
54. Id. For the full text of the notice sent, see the lower court's opinion, 138 F. Supp.
823, 824 (N.D. Ohio 1954).
55. See In re J.E. Brenneman Co., 312 F.2d 271, 274 (3d Cir. 1963), where the court
stated: "Suits in admiralty may only be brought or contested by the real parties in in-
terest." That the admiralty will not be overly rigid in ascertaining the real party in in-
terest, however, is illustrated by Saint Paul Marine Transp. Corp. v. Cerro Sales Corp.,
505 F.2d 1115 (9th Cir. 1974); Unilever Ltd. v. MIT Stolt Boel, 77 F.R.D. 384 (S.D.N.Y.
1977); Techem Chem. Co. v. M/T Choyo Maru, 416 F. Supp. 960 (D. Md. 1976). But see
Farbwerke Hoeschst A.G. v. M/V "Don Nicky," 589 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1979). See generally
MOORE & PELAEZ. supra note 2, .55[3].
56. But see text at Part III infra, where it is discussed that the ability to effectively
limit liability by a responsive answer to a claimant's suit has been greatly diminished by
recent judicial decisions.
57. In re Southern S.S. Co., 132 F. Supp. 316, 319 (D. Del. 1955).
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tolerated, and any form of notice that even arguably meets the rather
minimum standards set forth in the Act or the Rule should, in the
absence of a showing of prejudice by the shipowner, suffice."
Neither the Supplemental Rule nor the statute makes clear whether
an owner can commence limitation proceedings prior to receiving
notice of claim. The answer to that question is of more than theoretical
significance since it can affect the situs where all claims must be
litigated59 and, to a lesser extent, the right of a claimant to obtain a
jury trial."
The statute provides that the owner may petition for limitation
"within six months after a claimant shall have given to or filed with
such owner written notice of claim"61 which on its face seems to make
receipt of notice a condition precedent to the filing of a limitation com-
plaint. Supplemental Rule F(1), on the other hand, provides that the
limitation complaint can be filed "[n]ot later than six months""2 after
58. If the shipowner can show that the notice was insufficient to enable it to conduct
a sufficient investigation of the occurrence to rationally determine whether limitation was
feasible, and that use of such notice to trigger running of the six month period thus
causes it prejudice, the notice should be deemed to have fallen below the statutory re-
quirement. In the absence of such proof by the vessel owner, however, it is believed that
virtually any written notice should suffice. For analogous authority in a terrestrial in-
surance case, see Brakeman v. Potomac Ins. Co., 472 Pa. 66, 371 A.2d 193 (1977).
Brakeman and its progeny place the burden of proving prejudice on the insurer, believing
it to be in the better position to do so. That, most frequently, will also be true of vessel
owners in limitation cases. See note 37 supra.
59. See FED. R. Civ. P. F(9) (Supp.), reprinted in MOORE & PELAEZ. supra note 2,
F.01[11, dealing with venue in limitation proceedings.
But note that the Supplemental Rule specifically provides for transfer of limitation
proceedings "[flor the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice." Id.
Thus, any "edge" gained by the party who wins the race to the court house door might be
transitory. Where, however, there are two or more "convenient" forums available, the
right of initial selection could be of considerable importance.
60. A claimant desiring to obtain a jury trial might wish to proceed in a state court
pursuant to the Saving to Suitors Clause. If a limitation proceeding is commenced in a
federal district court before the commencement of such a state action, he might be com-
pelled to assert his claim in that proceeding, where jury trials are not permitted.
However, if the cause is truly one subject to limitation in a federal court, it will be
necessary for there to be multiple claimants. And, if that is the case, the claimant who
first elected to proceed in the state court will in all probability find that his state action is
stayed and he will be forced to assert his claim in the limitation proceeding. Thus, or-
dinarily, a ship owner will be able to prevent the claimant from having his claim deter-
mined by a jury even if the claimant is given first choice of a forum. There may be some
few instances, however, where early recourse to the limitation procedure by a shipowner
can prevent the claimant from seeking a jury trial on the merits which would otherwise
be available to him.
61. 46 U.S.C. § 185 (1976).
62. FED. R. Civ. P. F(1) (Supp.). Superseded Sup. Ct. Adm. R. 51 had no similar provi-
sion. See MOORE & PELAEZ, supra note 2, at .30.
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the owner's receipt of a claim in writing. While the Rule is capable of
being construed as permitting a limitation proceeding to be commenced
prior to notice, there is no indication that the Rule was intended to
enlarge the statutory power to limit. More than a century ago, the
Supreme Court seemingly answered this question when it said in Ex
parte Slayton,' "We are of opinion that ... the owner of a vessel may
institute appropriate proceedings ... to obtain the benefit of limitation
of liability ... without waiting for a suit to be begun against him or his
vessel for the loss out of which the liability arises."" However, Slayton
preceded the 1936 amendment to the Limitation Act which now con-
tains the seemingly restrictive language. 5 There are, however, post-
amendment decisions which reach the same conclusion.
63. 105 U.S. 451 (1881).
64. Id. at 451-52. For similar pre-1936 authority, see In re Thames Towboat Co., 21
F.2d 573 (D. Conn. 1927); Black v. Southern Pac. R.R., 39 F. 565, 567 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1889);
The Alpena, 8 F. 280, 284 (N.D. Ill. 1881); The John Bramall, 13 F. Cas. 655, 658 (E.D.N.Y.
1879) (No. 7,334). It should be noted that Slayton did not state specifically that a vessel
owner could limit before he received written notice of claim, but only that he need await
suit. That sensible approach eliminates the need to commence what may turn out to be a
needless lawsuit.
65. 46 U.S.C. § 185 (1976).
It should be noted that Slayton itself casts doubt on whether the ability to commence
limitation proceedings prior to receiving notice of a claim was available to an owner
against whom multiple claims were not likely to be asserted, by providing that: "[Olur
rules were not intended to prevent an owner from availing himself of any other remedy
or process which the law itself entitled him to adopt, but to aid him in bringing into con-
course those having claims against him arising from the acts of the master or crew." 105
U.S. at 452.
Prior to the 1936 amendment to the Limitation Act, it was clear that a claimant
against whom only a single claim was likely to be filed could not commence a limitation
proceeding. That was deemed true even if the single claim was greater than the value of
the vessel involved. Thus, Judge Learned Hand, in precluding a vessel owner against
whom a single claim had been filed from commencing limitation proceedings, said:
When there is but a single possible claim, a contrary result [permitting the owner
to commence limitation proceedings] would only remove the cause from the tribunal
properly vested with jurisdiction; in short, avoid a jury trial. The statute intended
nothing of the sort, and the effort is to be discountenanced.
In re Putnam, 55 F.2d 73, 75 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 286 U.S. 558 (1932). But see Cincinnati
Gas & Elec. Co. v. Abel, 533 F.2d 1001 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 858 (1976), and the
authorities discussed in the text at Part III infra, making clear that frequently the only way
the vessel owner today can assure availability of the limitation defense in even single
claim cases may be to file a Complaint to Limit Liability. This results from the fact that
limitation complaints must be filed within six months after receipt of notice of claim, and
from the fact that state courts are powerless to resolve the limitation issue if contested.
Thus, the customary practice is not to prevent filing of such complaints in single claim
cases but to hold them in abeyance pending outcome of any non-maritime action the claim-
ant may file.
To paraphrase Judge Hand, there is no indication that either the 1936 amendment to
the Limitation Act or the Supplemental Rule was intended to jeopardize an injured
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Foremost among the post-amendment decisions is In re Southern
Steamship Co.,68 where the owners of a vessel lost at sea filed a peti-
tion to limit liability even before notifying the families of the crew.
The claimants, seeking to have the petition dismissed, argued that
they had been denied the right to select the forum. The court could
find no such right in the rules or the statute, noting that, "[i]t is plainly
apparent that the foregoing Rules give no priority or choice of venue
to a claimant unless, in fact, a libel or suit antedates the limitation pro-
ceedings."8 Thus, the court rejected the contention that a shipowner
cannot initiate limitation proceedings without some prior action on
behalf of the claimant. However, the court was much swayed by the
fact that the then recently amended rule had for the first time pro-
vided for the transfer of limitation proceedings and, therefore, noted
that, "any question of priority of venue is of a temporay nature to be
finally determined as a matter of sound judicial discretion for the con-
venience of the parties.""8
But In re Southern Steamship Co. ignores the fact there may be
more than one convenient forum, and that one of those forums may be
far more convenient to the vessel owner than to the claimant. 9
Moreover, vessel owners almost by definition are likely to be more af-
fluent than many possessors of claims. Thus, forcing a claimant to
litigate in the least convenient to him of several legally acceptable
party's right under the Savings Clause to obtain a jury trial or that either pronouncement
was intended to provide a vessel owner who could reasonably anticipate a spate of claims
with an opportunity to have first crack at selection of the forum where the issues must
ultimately be resolved. Thus, while it is clear that the owner reasonably envisioning
multiple claims that will likely exceed the value of the involved vessel can select the
forum if he is first given written notice of a claim, it is still at least questionable whether
that choice can be exercised prior to receipt of such a written notice.
66. 132 F. Supp. 316 (D. Del. 1955). See also The Severance, 152 F.2d 916, 922 (4th
Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 853 (1946) ("The right of an owner to limit his liability...
cannot be frustrated by the mere failure of the injured party to file a libel.., or to allege
liability on the part of the vessel"); In re Wood, 124 F. Supp. 540, 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1954),
affd, 230 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1956) ("Claimants first argue that under Rule 51 of the Ad-
miralty Rules ... the petition is premature because no claim has as yet been filed. Rule
51 provides that the petition shall state, among other things, 'what suits, if any, are pend-
ing thereon'. It recognizes that the petition may be filed before claims are made, and this
has been held to be proper"). Neither case is directly analogous, since both deal with the
ability to commence limitation proceedings prior to a claimant's commencing suit, and not
prior to the giving of written notice of claim. There is no indication in The Severance or
In re Wood as to whether notice had been given.
67. 132 F. Supp. at 321.
68. Id. at 320.
69. It is conceivable, for example, that while one forum might be more convenient for
the claimants another forum will be more convenient to the vessel owner and both forums
might be equally convenient to a majority of witnesses. Thus, either forum would be ap-
propriate and transfer from one to the other would not be a likely contingency.
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forums may throw an economic obstacle into the path of his attempt at
recovery.70 And, finally, permitting the vessel owner-who is in actual
or practical fact the defendant-to select the forum even before a
claimant may be aware he has a cause of action,7' completely turns the
table on the ordinary practice of giving the initial choice to the party
claiming to be injured, and not to that party alleged to have caused the
wrong.72 Thus, the ability of a court to transfer a limitation proceeding
to a more convenient forum does not necessarily preclude the possibil-
ity that many claimants might incur a great deal more expense and in-
convenience than might otherwise have been necessary.
In sum, In re Southern Steamship Co. notwithstanding, the 1936
amendment can be construed both as setting a time limitation within
which the vessel owner desiring to limit his liability must act and, ad-
ditionally, providing the claimants-or at least one of them-with an
opportunity to have first choice of a federal judicial district if they
desire to proceed by commencing suit rather than by first providing
the vessel owner with written notice of claim. It must be remembered,
however, that in order to reach this conclusion it will be necessary to
convince a court that the 1936 amendment served in part to overrule
Ex parte Slayton,73 or to compel a narrow reading of that decision.
Since the amendment seems patently to have been designed to favor
claimants by narrowing the vessel owner's right to limit,74 it is not in-
conceivable that a court could find therein a similar desire to protect
claimants by providing them with an opportunity to choose which of
several convenient forums they deem "most acceptable." Whether that
70. The claimant litigating at a great distance from his home will, by way of illustra-
tion, incur housing expenses during trial, transportation expenses for trial and discovery
proceedings, etc., that could otherwise be obviated. Moreover, he will likely engage local
counsel who in turn will engage counsel at the trial site, which could result in fee-sharing
and, as a consequence, less dedicated attorney effort than might be the case if a single at-
torney were to retain the entire fee generated by the cause. See generally The Spoils to
the Traveler: Hearings Before the Sub-comm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of
the Comm. on the Judiciary on S. 1876, 92 Cong., 1st Sess. 233 (1971) (statement of Alfred
S. Pelaez).
71. Such was the case in In re Southern S.S. Co., 132 F. Supp. at 318. Even if the
limitation proceeding is filed after the claimant is aware of his cause of action, the race is
still likely to be won by the vessel owner because of his superior legal sophistication and
his awareness that time may indeed be a critical factor in controlling the outcome of the
prospective litigation.
72. See Pelaez, Interest Analysis-The Sands of Confusion, 9 DUQ. L. REv. 446,
453-56 (1971).
73. 105 U.S. 451 (1881). See notes 63-65 and accompanying text supra.
74. See Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. Abel, 533 F.2d 1001, 1005 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 858 (1976) ("[T]he purpose of amending Section 185 was to cut down the
right of a ship owner to limit his liability"); The Grasselli Chem. Co. No. 4, 20 F. Supp.
394, 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1937) ("Undoubtedly it was the purpose of the new legislation ... to cut
down the rights and privileges of the ship owner").
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will prove to be the case, however, awaits further judicial or
legislative clarification.
III. ASSERTING LIMITATION BY ANSWER
Filing a Complaint to Limit Liability is often economically war-
ranted and results in a conservation of judicial resources." In many
other instances, however, use of that device has exactly the opposite
effect," and it makes far more sense simply to assert the limitation
75. Where a spate of claims arising out of a single maritime occurrence is anticipated,
filing of a Complaint to Limit Liability will compel resolution of all claims in a single
judicial proceeding. The resultant concursus both cuts down the costs the vessel owner
might otherwise be compelled to incur in defending several separate suits in perhaps
numerous and widely separated forums, and conserves judicial resources by permitting a
single tribunal to resolve all disputes. Such an action also serves to eliminate the poten-
tially difficult collateral estoppel issues that are a natural by-product of fragmented litiga-
tion.
76. Filing a Complaint to Limit Liability will not prevent the commencement of
separate actions where there is but a single claimant or where the totality of the claims is
not likely to exceed the value of the vessel. See Lake Tankers Corp. v. Henn, 354 U.S. 147
(1957); Langnes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531 (1931). See also Staring, Limitation Practice and
Procedure, 53 TUL. L. REV. 1134, 1158-62 (1979). Thus, the filing of a Petition in such cases
often works to bifurcate the litigation with the limitation issue pending within the ad-
miralty jurisdiction of a federal district court selected by the owner and the merits of the
claim reposing in the forum (state or federal) chosen by the claimants. The bifurcation can
be even more extensive where there are several claimants whose total claims are alleged
to be less than the value of the vessel but where, out of an excess of caution on the part
of the owner or because the owner places a lesser value on his vessel, he deems it pru-
dent to file a limitation complaint.
Similarly, while it is clear that one filing a Complaint to Limit Liability must deposit
with the court either the subject res or a bond of sufficient size to cover the res, no
security need be deposited by one asserting limitation by way of defense. See The
Scotland, 105 U.S. 24 (1881); Federazione Italiana Dei Consorzi Agrari v. Mandask Com-
pania De Vapores, S.A., 223 F. Supp. 206 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), modified on other grounds, 342
F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1965). But see Deep Sea Tankers, Ltd. v. The Long Branch, 258 F.2d 757
(2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 933 (1959), where Judge Medina, writing for the
court, after stating the general rule that no security is required of one asserting limita-
tion as a defense to a claimant's suit, stated:
On the other hand, when limitation of liability is asserted by way of defense in the
answer there are interlocutory remedies open to a libelant to prevent loss or
depreciation of the vessel by requiring surrender or the posting of security. These
are procedural matters which do not appear to affect the substantive rights of the
parties and they are normally litigated before or at least during trial.
Id. at 773. In commenting on that clause, the court in Federazione Italiana Dei Consorzi
Agrari noted that its meaning "is by no means crystal clear," 223 F. Supp. at 207, and
concluded that there may exist judicial discretion to order security in such cases. The
court hastened to point out, however, that "[t]here has never been a case where security
was required of an answering owner." Id. Since the limitation defense can be asserted in
either a state or federal court, and since the former is not likely clothed with the author-
ity to require security, it seems wisest to accept Judge Medina's dictum in Deep Sea
Tankers as either ill-advised or inadvertent.
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defense by way of answer . 7 Until recently, it was generally assumed
that a vessel owner desiring to limit liability could pursue the least
costly and most efficient of -those alternative paths. Recent events,
however, give clear indication that economic logic and maritime law
have diverged.
It is abundantly clear that a vessel owner seeking to limit liability
to the after the occurrence value of the vessel and its pending freight
is not compelled to proceed by filing a Complaint to Limit Liability in
the district court but, alternatively, can assert the limitation defense
in answer to a suit commenced against him in either a state or federal
court.78 Moreover, it is clear that the six month period following
receipt of notice of claim which curtails the right to petition for limita-
tion does not apply to assertions of a limitation defense by way of
answer.79 A vessel owner who relies upon these truisms, however, runs
a considerable risk of losing the right to limit.
The problem arises because the Supreme Court has held that only
the federal district courts are clothed with jurisdiction to determine
77. While the Limitation Act specifically provides a procedure for the filing of a Peti-
tion to Limit Liability in 46 U.S.C. § 185 (1976), it has long been clear that this procedure
is not exclusive and that the Act's benefits can be obtained by asserting limitation as a
defense to a suit commenced against the vessel or its owner by an injured claimant. See
Ex parte Green, 286 U.S. 437 (1932); Langnes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531 (1931); Carlisle Pack-
ing Co. v. Sandanger, 259 U.S. 255 (1922); The Scotland, 105 U.S. 24 (1881).
Unquestionably, these alternative methods for claiming the benefits of limitation still
exist. It is also clear, however, that recourse to the answer device may be extremely
perilous to the vessel owner's interests in some cases. The reasons for this peril are
outlined in the remaining portions of this section.
78. See note 77 supra. The permission to limit by way of answer is derived from 46
U.S.C. § 183(a) (1976). As stated in Deep Sea Tankers, Ltd. v. The Long Branch, 258 F.2d
757 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 933 (1959):
There is ... a separate and distinct procedure by which a shipowner may limit
his liability in accordance with 46 U.S.C.A. § 183(a). A shipowner may institute a
separate proceeding by the filing of a petition for limitation or he may plead the
limitation statute, 46 U.S.C.A. § 183(a), in his answer as a defense to suit against
him.
Id. at 772.
79. See Deep Sea Tankers, Ltd. v. The Long Branch, 258 F.2d 757 (2d Cir. 1958), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 933 (1959); The Chickie, 141 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1944). While no case has held
otherwise, the court in Ohio River Co. v. City of Wheeling, 225 F. Supp. 733 (N.D.W. Va.
1964), noted that:
As a matter of first impression, this court would be inclined to rule that Sec-
tions 183 through 189, all of which concern the limitation of liability defense, should
be read in par materia and that the six months time limitation should be applied to
any method of asserting the Section 183 right.
Id. at 734. Nonetheless, the Ohio River Co. court followed the earlier precedents from
the Second and Third Circuits, although it refused to extend their holding to other areas.
See text accompanying notes 105-108 infra.
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whether there is a right to limit liability." Thus, if the vessel owner
does not file a Complaint to Limit Liability within six months after
receipt of written notice of claim and the plaintiff commences a
maritime action in a federal district court, any challenge to the limita-
tion defense can properly be decided by the court having jurisdiction
over the cause.8 If, however, the injured party elects to commence his
action in a state court pursuant to the provisions of the Saving to
Suitors Clause and the right to limit is challenged, the state court is
powerless to resolve that issue.82 Moreover, it has been held that the
limitation issues cannot be removed to a federal court for resolution,
since the only procedure for raising those issues in the federal court is
by way of answer-which cannot be done when the complaint is prop-
erly filed in a state court and there exists no independent basis of
federal jurisdiction-or by the filing of a Complaint for Limitation of
Liability, which by statute must be filed within six months of receipt
of written notice of claim.83
Thus, a vessel owner who receives written notice of a limitable
claim and does nothing until suit is filed by the plaintiff may well find
80. See Ex parte Green, 286 U.S. 437 (1932); Langnes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531 (1931);
Norwich Co. v. Wright, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 104 (1871).
In commenting upon the exclusivity of the admiralty's jurisdiction as set forth in these
cases, one observer noted: "This determination was based clearly upon the maritime
character of the subject matter, evidently upon the in rem character of the proceeding, in-
volving distribution of a fund representing vessel and freight.., and presumably but not
explicitly, upon the incompetence of the common law to provide the remedy, within the
meaning of the savings to suitors clause. ... Staring, Limitation Practice and Pro-
cedure, 53 TUL. L. REV. 1134, 1135 n.4 (1979).
81. This is clear at least where the subsequent federal court action is within the
court's admiralty jurisdiction. It is at least arguable that a federal district court exercis-
ing its civil non-maritime jurisdiction would also lack jurisdiction to determine the limita-
tion issue. See text accompanying notes 120-121 infra.
82. See Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. Abel, 533 F.2d 1001 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 858 (1976); Ohio River Co. v. City of Wheeling, 225 F. Supp. 733 (N.D.W. Va. 1964);
see text accompanying notes 105-112 infra.
83. See note 82 supra. These decisions clearly illustrate the lack of a removal or cer-
tification device to get the limitation issue before a federal district court if raised by way
of answer to a suit commenced in a state court and there is no independent basis of
federal jurisdiction, such as diversity of citizenship. Even if there is diversity of citizen-
ship and, as a consequence, the state action can be removed to federal court pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1976), it is not altogether clear whether the substantive right of limita-
tion can be there raised; see note 120 infra. It is probable that, in the absence of diversity,
there can be no removal to the "admiralty side" of the federal district court since that
would give the removal statute primacy over the Saving to Suitors Clause, and there is
no indication that was within the intention of Congress in providing for section 1441
removal. See Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959);
Giacona v. Capricorn Shipping Co., 394 F. Supp. 1189 (S.D. Tex. 1975); MOORE & PELAEZ, supra
note 2, 0.167 [3.-1].
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that he has not lost his right to limit damages if the suit is commenced
as a maritime action in a federal district court; but will have lost that
right if the plaintiff fails to cooperate and, instead, commences suit in a
state court after the running of the six month period from the giving
of written notice; and may have lost that right if the plaintiff com-
mences a non-maritime civil action in a federal district court. Obvi-
ously, providing the plaintiff with the key to permitting or preventing
a successful assertion of the limitation defense is a most perilous prac-
tice!
Thus, as a practical matter, any vessel owner who desires or thinks
he may desire to assert a limitation defense may be compelled to
follow the expensive procedure of petitioning for limitation of liability
within the six month period even though he does not anticipate a spate
of claims arising out of the occurrence and would prefer to raise the
limitation defense in the much less expensive manner of incorporating
it in his answer to the complaint.
The soundness of decisions that compel a party to commence un-
necessary and expensive legal proceedings may be questioned, and it is
conceivable that it will yet be determined that so cumbersome a prac-
tice is not legally compelled. Whether Congress or the courts will act
to alter the apparent drift of the law into this untenable position,
however, still remains to be seen.
The basis for the present dilemma began more than a century ago
when the Supreme Court, in dictum, noted that the state courts do not
have the requisite jurisdiction to conduct the appropriate proceedings
to implement the Limitation Act.' However, in Carlisle Packing Co. v.
84. Norwich Co. v. Wright, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 104 (1871). In Norwich, the owners of a
schooner damaged in a collision commenced a libel in personam against the owners of the
other vessel. The owners of the faulty vessel, by way of answer, claimed the benefits of
the 1851 Act permitting limitation of liability. The libellants averred that the district
court had no power to provide relief of that nature and, in that context, the Supreme
Court said:
It is also evident that the State courts have not the requisite jurisdiction. Unless,
therefore, the District Courts themselves can administer the law, we are reduced to
the dilemma of inferring that the legislature has passed a law which is incapable of
execution .... We have no doubt that the District Courts, as courts of admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction, have jurisdiction of the matter; and this court un-
doubtedly has the power to make all needful rules and regulations for facilitating
the course of proceeding.
Id. at 123-24.
Since the case dealt with an assertion of the right to limit in an action commenced in a
federal district court exercising its admiralty jurisdiction, the statement that state courts
lack jurisdiction over limitation matters is undoubtedly dictum. That fact has long been
mooted, however, by a slew of subsequent Supreme Court decisions to the same effect.
The Supreme Court, in the Norwich case, outlined the appropriate procedures for fil-
ing a petition for limitation of liability which is similar to the procedure presently con-
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Sandanger,85 a maritime action commenced in a state court, the
Supreme Court flatly stated, "In a state court, when there is only one
possible claimant and one owner, the advantage of this action [the
Limitation Act] may be obtained by proper pleading."8 6 Thus, it ap-
peared that-at least if there was only one possible claimant and one
owner-the limitation defense, if timely asserted, could be determined
by a state court having jurisdiction over the overriding cause. Ap-
pearances, however, are deceiving, for the Sandanger Court cited as
authority for its conclusion two lower court cases" which were subse-
quently taken as illustrating that the Court had not deviated from its prior
holdings that only the federal district courts had jurisdiction to deter-
mine whether the right to limit exists.88 And, if that is so, the right to
tained in Supplemental Rule F, and noted that "[f]or aiding parties in this behalf, and
facilitating proceedings in the District Courts, we have prepared some rules which will be
announced at an early day." Id. at 125. Within a year after the Norwich case, the
Supreme Court amended the Admiralty Rules of 1844 by, inter alia, adding thereto a rule
providing for the filing of a Petition to Limit Liability. The 1872 amendment to the 1844
Admiralty Rules is, as might well be expected, virtually identical to the procedures
outlined in the Norwich case.
85. 259 U.S. 255 (1922).
86. Id. at 260. The defendant vessel owner did not raise the limitation defense in its
answer to the state court complaint, but nonetheless requested a jury instruction based
on the Limitation Act. The Supreme Court, in affirming the state court's refusal to give
such an instruction, said, "Here the privilege was not set up or claimed in the answer, and
it could not be first presented upon request for a charge to the jury." Id.
Thus, while the Supreme Court made clear that limitation by answer could be asserted
in a state court proceeding where there is only a single owner and claimant, it was deemed
properly refused in the case before the Court.
87. As authority for the language quoted in the text accompanying note 86 supra, the
Supreme Court cited Delaware River Ferry Co. v. Amos, 179 F. 756 (E.D. Pa.), cert.
dismissed, 218 U.S. 688 (1910); and The Lotta, 150 F. 219 (D.S.C. 1907).
In The Lotta the court made clear that, "where there is only a single claim, and there
is no need of an apportionment of the proceeds of the vessel among several claimants...
[aln answer setting up the limitation of liability ... is all that is necessary to give to the
owner of the vessel the relief to which he is entitled." Id. at 222. Moreover, the decision
makes clear that such an answer can be asserted in response to a proceeding commenced
in a state court. However, the district court refused to dismiss the Petition to Limit
which had been filed there, "for, if it should hereafter appear in the course of the pro-
ceedings in the state court that a question is raised as to the right of petitioner to a
limited liability, this court has exclusive cognizance of such a question." Id. at 223.
In Delaware River Ferry Co. v. Amos the court dismissed a Petition to Limit Liabil-
ity by an owner against whom the claimant had obtained a state court judgment because,
inter alia, "the company's right to limit its liability is not questioned by the respondent."
179 F. at 759.
88. See Langnes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531 (1931). There, the Supreme Court held that a
federal district court had jurisdiction to entertain a Petition to Limit Liability filed by the
owner of a vessel sued in a state court proceeding even though there was but a single
claimant. But the Court went on to hold that this jurisdiction should not be exercised in
such instances since it would interfere with the claimant's rights under the Saving to
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assert the limitation defense to a cause of action brought in a state
court is no more than the right to assert a defense which the court is
powerless to consider if challenged. 9 Subsequent decisions of the
Suitors Clause to have his cause deternined in a state court with a jury. Nonetheless, the
Court-citing The Lotta and Delaware River Ferry Co. v. Amos-said:
Needless to say that if the case for a limitation of liability assumes such a form that
only a federal court is competent to afford relief, the jurisdiction of that court is ex-
clusive and must be exerted to dispose of the entire cause; and the action in the
state court may not be further prosecuted.
Id. at 540. See also Ex parte Green, 286 U.S. 437 (1932).
Thus, Sandanger notwithstanding, it is today clear that while a state court may deter-
mine whether the vessel owner is liable at all to the claimant and, if he is, the value of the
vessel and her freight if limitation is claimed and not questioned, only the federal district
court exercising its admiralty jurisdiction can dispose of the question of whether the
limitation defense can properly be asserted in the particular instance.
89. Ex parte Green, 286 U.S. 437 (1932), and Langnes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531 (1931),
provide clear indication that a claimant's challenge to the vessel owner's right to limit will
be sufficient to oust the state court of jurisdiction over the entire cause and compel that
all issues be determined in the federal district court, at least where there yet remains a
procedure for getting the case before that tribunal. See, in particular, Ex parte Green,
where the Court stated:
Green, following the remission of the cause to the state court, put in issue the right
of the owner to limited liability, by challenging the seaworthiness of the vessel and
the lack of the owner's privity or knowledge. The matter was properly brought
before the federal district court, and that court held that the question of the
owner's right to limited liability having been raised, the cause became cognizable
only in admiralty, and that its further prosecution in the state court should be en-
joined. In this the district court was right ....
286 U.S. at 440.
It is equally clear, however, that a claimant in a single claim case, and perhaps multi-
ple claimants in a case where the totality of the claims does not exceed the value of the
vessel, can "save" the right to proceed at common law by stipulation. The Supreme Court
has never determined whether the stipulation must be that the owner has the right to
have the limitation issue determined in the federal courts; or that the claimant will not
challenge the owner's right to limit. If the price for saving the state court action is
stipulating to the substantive validity of the limitation petition, the price for retention of
the state court action could be high. If, on the other hand, the claimant need only
stipulate that the owner has the right to have the question of its right to limit determined
by a district court exercising its admiralty jurisdiction, the trade off is minimal. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has quite clearly concluded that
the stipulation need only be as to the owner's right to have the limitation issue deter-
mined by the admiralty court. See In re Red Star Barge Line, Inc., 160 F.2d 436 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 331 U.S. 850 (1947). The Second Circuit recognized that permitting one pro-
ceeding in a state court to challenge the owner's substantive right to limit might cause
res judicata or collateral estoppel problems, and thus ordered that:
As a precaution against that possible danger, we think it would be reasonable and
fair to all pairties to require the appellee to file in the district court a statement
that she [the claimant] waives any claim of res judicata relevant to the issue of
limited liability and based on any judgment she may obtain in the state court ac-
tion.
Id. at 438.
In re Red Star has continued to be followed by the Second Circuit and there is no flatly
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Supreme Court make clear that this, indeed, was the nature of the
"right" approved by Sandanger.Y
The impotence of the state courts to resolve disputed questions as
to the right to limit was of no immediate consequence, since it was
then clear that a Petition to Limit Liability could be filed in and
resolved by the federal district court even following a state court's
resolution of the underlying liability question on the merits.,1 Thus, the
vessel owner could safely await the institution of suit by the claimant
and, if the claimant refused to stipulate that the claim was subject to
limitation, have that matter resolved by the federal district court. If,
on the other hand, the claimant did not contest the owner's right to
limit, or if the jury award was less than the stipulated to or judicially
determined value of the offending vessel, there would be no need to
limit and the expenses of instituting a limitation proceeding and
posting the requisite security could be safely avoided.
In that setting, it was not irrational for the Supreme Court to say
both that limitation could be asserted as a defense to a state court ac-
tion and that the question of the right to limit was exclusively within
the province of the district courts exercising their admiralty jurisdic-
tion.92
contradictory authority in any other circuit. It could be argued, however, that such a
stipulation on the part of the claimant is tantamount to giving no concession at all since,
in return for the right to continue with the state court proceeding and to have a jury pass
upon the question of the vessel owner's liability, the claimant is giving up only the right
to have the limitation issue heard by the only court with jurisdiction to hear that issue.
For an indication that the law may require more of the claimant who desires to proceed at
common law, see Staring, Limitation Practice and Procedure, 53 TUL. L. REV. 1134 (1979),
where the author states:
The claimant is required to stipulate ... that liability is limited as a condition of
proceeding at common law .... The result . . . is that the alternative court pro-
ceeding at common law has only the traditional common law function of deciding a
claim for damages, subject to a maximum which has in effect been agreed on by the
parties.
Id. at 1139. The author cites no authority for that conclusion.
90. See Ex parte Green, 286 U.S. 437 (1932); Langnes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531 (1931).
91. Larsen v. Northland Transp. Co., 292 U.S. 20 (1934); The City of Norwich, 118
U.S. 468 (1885); The Benefactor, 103 U.S. 239 (1880).
92. Indeed, in a single claim situation, that "solution" often worked to save both
litigation expenses and judicial resources while at the same time avoiding unnecessary
conflict between the claimant's right to a jury trial preserved by the Saving to Suitors
Clause and the exclusive jurisdiction over the limitation issue found to exist in the Limita-
tion Act. Such conflict could be avoided if the "saved" proceeding resulted in a verdict for
the defendant ship-owner or in a verdict for the claimant in an amount less than the after
the occurrence value of the vessel. Similarly, it provided a great deal of time within which
the claims could be disposed of by settlement. Thus, all matters were usually resolved in
the "saved" proceedings, and it was not often necessary to conduct the subsequent limita-
tion proceeding in the federal district court.
1981
Duquesne Law Review
Beginning in 1936, however, the game changed. In that year Con-
gress amended the Limitation Act requiring for the first time that
Petitions to Limit Liability be filed within six months following receipt
of claims in writing. 3 The lower courts could find no intention on the
part of Congress to eliminate the former practice of permitting limita-
tion to be asserted also by way of defense to actions commenced
against the vessel owner in either federal or state courts, and thus,
continuation of that former practice remained permissible. 4 However,
while the 1936 amendment did not curtail the right to assert limitation
by way of answer, neither did it enhance that right-ie., the right was
still circumscribed by its former limitation of precluding any but a
federal district court from deciding whether the vessel owner was en-
titled to limit in a particular instance. And now, as a result of the need
to file Complaints for Limitation within the six month period, the
former restrictions on the jurisdiction of the state courts took on an
added significance. For, if the state courts are powerless to resolve the
question of whether the vessel owner has a right to limit and if that
question is not placed at issue until after the six month limitation
period has expired, it is conceivable that the right to assert the limita-
tion defense by way of answer is so hollow as to be meaningless. 5
The post-amendment era stated inconspicuously enough with The
Chickie, an admiralty in rem action commenced by the owner of a
vessel damaged as a result of a collision with the defendant vessel. The
owners of the Chickie, within the six month period, filed an admittedly
defective Petition for Limitation of and Exoneration from Liability.9 7
Subsequently, and after the six months had run, the same owners
sought to limit liability by way of answer to the in rem action that had
been commenced by the injured party. The plaintiffs contended that
93. See Act of June 5, 1936, ch. 521, § 3, 49 Stat. 1480 (amending Act of March 3,
1851, ch. 43, § 4, 9 Stat. 635) (current version at 46 U.S.C. § 185 1976)), mandating that the
vessel owner file the petition to limit liability within six months after receipt of written
notice of claim. See note 6 and accompanying text supra.
94. See Federazione Italiana Dei Consorze Agrari v. Mandask Compania De Vapores,
S.A., 284 F. Supp. 356, 364-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), modified on other grounds, 388 F.2d 434 (2d
Cir. 1968), and the authorities cited therein.
Moreover, it seems clear enough that the right to assert the limitation defense to the
claimant's action exists beyond the six month period after which the owner receives writ-
ten notice of the limitable claim. See Erie Sand S.S. Co. v. Peter Kiewit & Sons Co., 1978
A.M.C. 2241 (N.D. Ohio 1978), and the numerous authorities cited therein.
95. That this consequence has in fact occurred is illustrated by .Cincinnati Gas &
Elec. Co. v. Abel, 533 F.2d 1001 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 858 (1976); Ohio River Co.
v. City of Wheeling, 225 F. Supp. 733 (N.D.W. Va. 1964).
96. 141 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1944).
97. The petition was defective since the vessel owner had neither deposited the res
with the court nor filed a bond in the proper amount.
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limitation by way of answer was also time-barred as a result of the
1936 amendment to the Limitation Act, and that contention was re-
jected by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. In
a widely followed opinion, Circuit Judge Goodrich noted that there had
long been two ways to assert limitation-by answer pursuant to sec-
tion 183(a) of the Act98 and by petition pursuant to section 185 of the
Act9 -and that the time limitation provision had been inserted only in
the latter section. As a result, the court said:
We think it is abundantly clear, in view of the historical development of
the statute, that the time limitation put in § 185 by the 1936 Amendment
and made expressly applicable to a proceeding by petition at the suit of
the owner, is not to be read into § 183(a) by implication, particularly in
view of the fact that both sections were simultaneously amended in
1936.'1
In reaching that conclusion, the court stressed that a contrary ruling
would "militate against the well settled rule that the courts are to con-
strue the statute liberally"10' in favor of vessel owners; and would com-
pel a ship owner in even a single claim situation to commence a limita-
tion proceeding if the injured party gave notice but delayed filing suit.
That reasoning was embraced by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit in Deep Sea Tankers, Ltd. v. The Long
Branch,0 2 another action commenced within the admiralty jurisdiction
of the district court where limitation was raised by way of answer
more than six months following written notice of claim. There, citing
The Chickie with approval, the court said:
Section 185, as amended, does not refer to Section 183(a), and no reason
has been advanced by appellants for making the right to limitation as pro-
vided in Section 183(a) subject to the six months time bar. Indeed, the
Congress amended both Section 183(a) and Section 185 simultaneously in
1936 without specifying any time limit in Section 183(a). Moreover, the
abuses which resulted under Section 185 prior to its amendment are not
encountered when limitation is pleaded by way of answer, because the
libelant, by filing its libel, controls the time within which the remedy
must be invoked. Therefore ... we hold that the ... plea of limitation in
its answer was not barred by the six months time limit of 46 U.S.C. §
185.103
It is significant that both The Chickie and Deep Sea Tankers dealt
with actions already within the admiralty jurisdiction of the district
98. 46 U.S.C. § 183(a) (1976).
99. Id. § 185.
100. 141 F.2d at 85.
101. Id.
102. 258 F.2d 757 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 933 (1959).
103. Id. at 772-73.
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courts. Thus, the courts in which the action was then pending had full
jurisdictional powers to deal with the limitation issue once raised. For
either court, in that position, to have concluded that the limitation
defense was not capable of being asserted, then, would have been tan-
tamount to a finding that the 1936 amendments to the Limitation Act
worked to overturn prior rulings of the Supreme Court.14 And, as each
court pointed out, no such legislative intent can be found in the history
of the amendments.
It thus remained to be determined if a court lacking the jurisdiction
to resolve the limitation issue could somehow resolve those issues or
at least certify them to the proper court for resolution. Clear indica-
tion that there existed no appropriate procedure for getting the issue
before an admiralty tribunal first surfaced in Ohio River Co. v. City of
Wheeling."5 That case arose out of damage to a public parking garage
caused by drifting coal barges chartered by the Ohio River Company.
Written notice of claim was mailed to the Ohio River Company on
April 9, 1963. An action for damage to the parking garage was com-
menced by the city in a state court on September 19, 1963, and in an
answer to the state action filed on November 11, 1963, the Ohio River
Company asserted, inter alia, a defense based on the Limitation of
Liability Act. The city challenged Ohio River's right to seek limitation
in the state proceeding and, while the matter was there pending, the
defendant charterer filed in the federal district court a pleading en-
titled "Complaint," in which it asked the federal court to take jurisdic-
tion of the limitation issue. The city, in response to that pleading, filed
a motion for summary judgment.
Initially, it was clear that the pleading filed in the federal court did
not satisfy the requirements of a section 185 Petition to Limit Liabil-
ity, both because it was unaccompanied by a bond or other res and
because it was filed after expiration of the six month period. Thus, if
the defense could be successfully entertained by the district court, it
had to be as a result of the defendant's power tb assert limitation as a
defense to the claimant's action pursuant to section 183 of the Limita-
tion Act. The district court first noted that, had this case been one of
first impression, it would have been inclined to hold that the six month
limitation period applied to attempts to limit by either petition or
104. The Supreme Court had held many times that limitation could be raised as a
defense to the claimant's action, and that exclusive jurisdiction to determine the merits of
that defense reposed in the district courts while exercising their admiralty jurisdiction.
Thus, a contrary ruling in The Chickie or in Deep Sea Tankers would have been tanta-
mount to a finding that the 1936 Amendment to the Limitation Act legislatively overruled
those decisions or that the amendments added the six month statute of limitations to all
assertions of the right to limit, including those raised by way of answer.
105. 225 F. Supp. 733 (N.D.W. Va. 1964).
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answer."' It recognized, however, that this issue had been resolved dif-
ferently by the Second Circuit in Deep Sea Tankers, a decision it
recognized as "persuasive, if not binding, authority.""10 But, even
though adhering to those decisions which permitted limitation by
answer more than six months after receipt of written notice of claim,
the court refused to extend the rule of those cases, preferring instead
"to limit its doctrine [the doctrine of Deep Sea Tankers] to its factual
situation- permitting the invocation of the Act as a defense in an ac-
tion in the Federal court having admiralty jurisdiction- not to extend
it to the situation where an affirmative petition is filed beyond the six-
months period."1 8 Thus, the court denied the Ohio River Company's re-
quest that the state court proceedings be enjoined, and granted the
plaintiffs motion for summary judgment.
The Ohio River Co. case, a decision which was not cited in another
opinion for more than twelve years, could be dismissed as a clumsy,
and ineffective, attempt by the charter to file a section 185 petition
after termination of the six month period, with dictum that a section
183 defense after expiration of the six month time limitation could only
be asserted in an action pending within the admiralty jurisdiction of a
federal district court. Thus, it was not inconceivable that-Ohio River
Co. notwithstanding-a limitation defense could still be asserted in a
case not within the admiralty jurisdiction of a federal district court
and that, somehow, this issue could be certified or removed to the
federal disrict court for resolution if the right to limit was contested.
A series of federal court cases indicated that this was a proper con-
struction of the state of the law by permitting the successful assertion
of limitation defenses in cases brought within the civil jurisdiction of
those courts."9 For, the federal courts, exercising their civil jurisdic-
tion, also lacked the power to resolve the purely admiralty issue unless
that power was somehow ancillary or pendent to their civil jurisdiction
106. The district court stated that:
It is noteworthy that the Supreme Court has never passed upon the meaning or ap-
plication of the six-months limitation of time inserted in Section 185 by the 1936
Amendment. As a matter of first impression, this court would be inclined to rule
that Sections 183 through 189, all of which concern the limitation of liability
defense, should be read in pari materia and that the six months time limitation
should be applied to any method of asserting the Section 183 right.
Id. at 734.
107. Id. at 735.
108. Id. (emphasis in original).
109. See Erie Sand S.S. Co. v. Peter Kiewit & Sons Co., 1978 A.M.C. 2241 (NJ). Ohio
1978); Odegard v. E. Quist, Inc., 199 F. Supp. 449 (E.D.N.Y. 1961); Murray v. New York
Cent. R.R., 171 F. Supp. 80 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), affd, 287 F.2d 152 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 366
U.S. 945 (1961); DeCruz v. Hiering, 69 F. Supp. 397 (D.N.J. 1947); Carpenter v. Mary R.
Mullins, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 10 (D. Mass. 1940).
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or unless the limitation issue could be freely transferred to the ad-
miralty side of the court. Yet the apparent lack of jurisdiction and the
lack of a clearly articulated procedural device did not prevent a single
federal district court faced with a limitation answer to a civil suit from
resolving that issue or concluding that it was beyond their power to
resolve. And if, the reasoning could continue, the federal courts sitting
as civil courts could somehow get the limitation issue over to the "ad-
miralty side" of the court, or otherwise dispose of the limitation issue,
certification or some similar device must exist for permitting state
courts to deal with those defenses which the Supreme Court had said
could properly be raised in causes pending before them, but which
they were powerless to decide.
Any such belief was severly jolted by the decision of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Cincinnati Gas & Elec-
tric Co. v. Abel. ' The M/V Reddy Kilowatt, owned by Cincinnati Gas
& Electric, collided with a marina on the Ohio River owned by Ms.
Abel. On January 30, 1974, Ms. Abel wrote the electric company
demanding payment for the damage and, on May 7 of that year she
commenced suit in an Ohio state court. In an answer filed on June 19,
110. 533 F.2d 1001 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 858 (1976). Any belief that the Ohio
River Co. case was an aberration that could safely be ignored should also have been
dispelled by Cooper v. Allison, 243 Or. 179, 412 P.2d 356 (1966). There, a passenger on a
sport fishing vessel sued the owner of the vessel in a state court and the latter asserted
limitation of liability as an affirmative defense in his answer. The plaintiff replied, deny-
ing the defendant's right to limit, and the trial court held a non-jury hearing to determine
that issue, resolving the question in favor of the vessel owner. The Supreme Court of
Oregon reversed and remanded concluding that "a state court does not have the jurisdic-
tion to hear and decide the issue of the right to limit liability." Id. at 183, 412 P.2d at 358
(emphasis in original). Moreover, the court noted that the plaintiff's failure to object to
the nature of the proceeding was irrelevant because "this is truly a matter of 'jurisdiction'
and cannot be stipulated or conceded." Id. at 184, 412 P.2d at 358.
But see The Golden Touch, 1967 A.M.C. 353 (R.I. Super. Ct. 1966), dealing with the
plaintiffs motion to strike a limitation defense asserted by a vessel owner in a state court
action. The court framed the issue as "whether . . . this Court may have before it the
question of limitation of liability," and concluded that it might. Professors Gilmore and
Black cite that case as authority for the conclusion, "that a state court does have jurisdic-
tion to decide the limitation issue where the Act is pleaded in a state court proceeding."
GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 16, at 859. However, it does not appear that the plaintiff-
claimant in The Golden Touch challenged the right of the vessel owner to limit, but in-
stead challenged only his right to assert limitation as a defense to a state court action.
And, the Supreme Court has long made clear that the right to assert the limitation
defense exists, while it has nowhere indicated that, once asserted, the state courts are
free to resolve that issue. Thus, it is by no means clear that The Golden Touch is at all
contradictory to Cooper v. Allison or to Cincinnati Gas & Elec Co. v. Abel. Un-
fortunately, the Rhode Island Supreme Court refused the claimant's petition for a writ of
certiorari, so that the precise status of the claimant's objection is not made clear in any
reported decision.
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1974, the defendant power company asserted, by way of answer, the
Limitation Act. The power company filed a motion for partial summary
judgment limiting its liability, and Abel opposed the motion on the
ground that, inter alia, there existed material issues of fact as to privity.
On November 5, 1974-after expiration of the six month period follow-
ing receipt of written notice of claim-the power company filed a mo-
tion in the state court to stay all proceedings in that court "until such
time as the movant shall have had an opportunity to have invoked the
jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio."'1 The court of common pleas granted the stay, and
on December 3, 1974, the power company filed a complaint in the dis-
trict court seeking exoneration from or limitation of liability, together
with an appropriate bond. Ms. Abel pleaded the six month statute of
limitations as a defense to that pleading, and the district court granted
summary judgment and dismissed the complaint.
In affirming the dismissal, the court of appeals noted that the state
court lost jurisdiction of the limitation of liability issue when the right
to limit was contested by Ms. Abel, and that there was at that time no
available method for getting this issue before the federal district court.
As stated by the court of appeals, "the only method available to CGE
for invoking that jurisdiction [the federal court's jurisdiction to deter-
mine the limitation issue] was to follow the procedures prescribed by
Section 185 and Supplemental Rule F for Admiralty and Maritime
Claims which incorporates the six months requirement of Section
185. ' ' In reaching its decision, the court of appeals made it abundant-
ly clear that an owner receiving notice of a limitable claim acts at his
peril if he does not file the limitation petition within the six month
period and, instead, waits for suit on the merits to be filed by the in-
jured party.
Indeed, a subsequent decision indicates that if anyone can now safely
await developments in the state court case before acting decisively on
the limitation issue, it may be the injured claimant. In Malone v. A.L.
Mechling Barge Lines, Inc."' an injured longshoreman brought a state
court action against the owner of a barge, alleging that he had been in-
jured as a result of the barge's unseaworthy condition. The defendant
barge owner pleaded the affirmative defense of limitation of liability
and the longshoreman did not immediately contest that defense. Some
two years later the longshoreman replied, denying the vessel owner's
right to limit. The barge owner then commenced a limitation pro-
ceeding in the federal district court which was dismissed as being un-
111. 533 F.2d at 1002.
112. Id. at 1005.
113. 63 Ill. App. 3d 756, 380 N.E.2d 497 (1978).
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timely brought, and in the state court action the injured longshoreman
was awarded a verdict far in excess of the barge's value. Apparently,
therefore, if anyone is now permitted to act without haste in the
limitation area, it is in all probability the claimant. Malone not-
withstanding, however, it seems evident that at some point the
dilatory claimant may be found to have waived his right to challenge
the limitation defense and deemed to have acquiesced thereto.
Especially would this appear to be true if the limitation defense was
asserted prior to the running of the six month period so that a timely
challenge thereto could have been remedied by the timely commence-
ment of a limitation proceeding in the federal district court. If the
limitation defense is not asserted until the expiration of the six month
time period, however, it might be difficult for the vessel owner to
claim that even a great deal of delay has in any material way caused
him prejudice. And he might be placed in the uncomfortable position of
seeking to have the court provide him with a windfall gain despite the
risk he took in failing to timely commence limitation proceedings. In
short, where the delay is not coupled with any prejudice other than
the loss of a benefit which could not then have been freely obtained by
the vessel owner,.it may fall short of that amount of laches required to
penalize the injured claimant. Clearly, a ship owner's dependence upon
laches to protect him against his own prior lack of caution is a slender
reed upon which to premise so significant a right as the right to limit
liability.
The Chickie'" and Deep Sea Tankers"' make it clear (insofar as
anything can be clear in this arcane area) that a vessel owner who is
sued in a Rule 9(h) admiralty action can safely assert the limitation
defense by way of answer after expiration of the six month period and
need not file a Petition to Limit in order to protect that right."6 Subse-
114. 141 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1944); see notes 96-101 and accompanying text supra.
115. 258 F.2d 757 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 933 (1959); see notes 102-104 and
accompanying text supra.
116. But see The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972). Unterweser,
owner of the MIS Bremen, agreed to tow Zapata's drilling rig and the contract contained a
forum selection clause compelling litigation to take place in London. The rig was damaged
and Unterweser was instructed to tow it to Tampa. Zapata then commenced a suit in ad-
miralty in a federal district court, and Unterweser sought to have that action dismissed or
stayed on the basis of the forum selection clause. While the motion to dismiss or stay was
pending, and shortly before the expiration of the six month period after which it had
received notice of claim, Unterweser filed a Petition to Limit Liability in the federal
district court in Tampa. Zapata contended, among other things, that the filing of the
limitation petition prevented Unterweser from relying upon the forum selection clause. In
dismissing that contention, the Supreme Court said:
It is clear that Unterweser's action in filing its limitation complaint . . . was ...
solely a defensive measure made necessary as a response to Zapata's breach of the
forum clause of the contract. When the six-month statutory period for filing an ac-
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quent decisions seemed to make clear that the vessel owner could take
similar action if the suit against him was commenced in a federal
district court pursuant to that court's civil jurisdiction. Thus, in Mur-
ray v. New York Central Railroad"7 the court rejected the plaintiffs
contention that the defendant vessel owner asserting a limitation
defense to a civil action commenced in the federal district court was
estopped for failing to proceed within six months after receipt of writ-
ten notice of claim, and additionally rejected the contention that the
limitation defense could not be asserted in a civil action brought pur-
tion to limit its liability had almost run without the District Court's having ruled on
Unterweser's initial motion to dismiss or stay Zapata's action pursuant to the
forum clause, Unterweser had no other prudent alternative but to protect itself by
filing for limitation of its liability .... There is no basis on which to conclude that
this purely necessary defensive action by Unterweser should preclude it from rely-
ing on the forum clause it bargained for.
407 U.S. at 19-20. In a footnote, the Court added:
Zapata has suggested that Unterweser was not in any way required to file its
"affirmative" limitation complaint because it could just as easily have pleaded
limitation of liability by way of defense in Zapata's initial action, either before or
after the six-month period. That course of action was not without risk, however,
that Unterweser's attempt to limit its liability by answer would be held invalid....
We do not believe this hazardous option in any way deprived Unterweser's limita-
tion complaint of its essentially defensive character so far as Zapata was concerned.
Id. at 19 n.20.
It is not at all clear why reliance upon the assertion of limitation by way of answer
would have been so hazardous, and the Court gives no clue as to the basis for that
gratuitous observation. The opinion makes clear that there were "other potential
claimants," id. at 5, and it may be that to have sought limitation by answer was hazardous
in that it would not have prevented those other claimants from instituting suits in forums
where limitation could not have been asserted. If that is so, Zapata cannot be construed
as an indication that the right to limit by answer has been curtailed any further than
achieved by the Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. case. See note 110 and accompanying text
supra. If the anticipated hazard related to the right to limit Zapata's claim, however, the
decision suggests major changes in limitation law. Zapata's suit was already pending in an
admiralty action in a federal district court and, in such an instance, it has been uniformly
held that the limitation defense may be asserted and that it may be asserted beyond the
six month period applicable to Petitions to Limit. It is conceivable, however, that if
Zapata's action was dismissed, that would also put an end to the limitation defense and
the defense might be incapable of being successfully asserted in whatever new forum the
action might be reinstituted.
While it is unclear why the majority of the Zapata Court thought failure to file the
Limitation Petition would be hazardous, its undoubted practical effect has been to make
wary all counsel who might formerly have relied on the right to limit by answer in areas
outside the scope of Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. And, in that regard, Zapata has also ad-
ded to the likelihood that limitation by answer will invariably be coupled with the filing of
a limitation petition. Thus, while defense lawyers may profit, both vessel owners and the
burdened federal judiciary may long continue to pay for Chief Justice Burger's gratuitous
observation!
117. 287 F.2d 152 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 945 (1961).
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suant to the Jones Act.18 The court there said: "If limitation may be
pleaded as a defense beyond this six month period, it would be
unreasonable to make its availability turn on whether a plaintiff elects
to bring suit on the admiralty side or the civil side of the court."'1
In reaching that conclusion, the court noted that a contrary result
would "disregard the desirability of one trial only, where all rights can
be fairly decided in a single legal proceeding."" But, if indeed the
limitation defense can only be determined by the federal district court
after its admiralty jurisdiction has been properly invoked-either by
the plaintiff's commencing a Rule 9(h) suit or by the defendant's peti-
tioning to limit liability-it could be argued with equal force that the
refusal to entertain the limitation defense by the federal district court
exercising its non-maritime jurisdiction would in fact also result in all
issues being decided in a single legal proceeding, since no court would
then be authorized to hear the limitation claim. Thus, it is at least
possible that if the goal is only to prevent two legal proceedings where
but one would suffice, answer by way of limitation to a federal court
civil action should be limited to those situations where the answer con-
taining the limitation defense is filed in response to a federal court
civil action within six months after receipt of written notice of
claim-or in response to a 9(h) admiralty action.12" ' Arguably, the deci-
118. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976).
119. 287 F.2d at 154.
120. Id. at 153. The desirability of a single legal proceeding notwithstanding, it is
abundantly clear that today cautious lawyers are forced to litigate in at least two courts
in many limitation cases that could easily be handled in a less costly and time consuming
manner. See, e.g., Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. Abel, 533 F.2d 1001 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 858 (1976); see text accompanying notes 110-112 supra. If a significant
desire was to cut down on multiple litigation in the limitation area, it is at least arguable
that either Congress or the Supreme Court would by now have developed a procedure
permitting a timely asserted limitation defense to a state court action to be determined
by a forum clothed with the appropriate jurisdiction. Yet, it is the absence of such a pro-
cedure that virtually compels cautious and informed counsel to institute multiple legal
proceedings.
121. To dismiss the maritime defense to a civil action at a time when that defense
could still be timely asserted by the separate commencement of a limitation proceeding
would be excessively technical. Moreover, treating the "defense" as a form of "limited"
limitation petition-ie., a limitation petition applicable only to the plaintiff, and not to any
others who might be able to assert claims against the defendant owner as a result of the
occurrence-is analogous to the normal procedure of treating a "civil" action that can only
be brought in the federal courts pursuant to those courts' admiralty jurisdiction as a FED.
R. Civ. P. 9(h) (Supp.) action, even though not labeled as such. See Fitzgerald v. Angela
Compania Naviera, S.A., 417 F. Supp. 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), rev'd'on other grounds, 592
F.2d 58 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 443 U.S. 928 (1979), where the court stated: "Thus, in
the instant case, although admiralty jurisdiction was not specifically pleaded, it is clearly
present and the court finds itself to have jurisdiction on that ground." Id. at 154. See also
MOORE & PELAEZ, supra note 2, .53[3].
Hearing a limitation defense to an action properly within the district court's non-
Vol. 19:265
Limiting Liability in Admiralty
sion of the court in Murray is not contrary to that conclusion because,
as pointed out in both that case and by the Sixth Circuit in Cincinnati
Gas & Electric Co., the plaintiff in Murray had already invoked the ad-
miralty jurisdiction of the district court in a connected maintenance
and cure claim, and thus the court in which the maritime defense was
asserted had already acquired admiralty jurisdiction over at least a
portion of the case."
While it can be argued that a federal court having civil jurisdiction
over a maritime cause should additionally be given jurisdiction over
the purely maritime defense of limitation of liability on the basis of -its
ancillary or perhaps even its pendent jurisdiction, neither of those doc-
trines has even been used as a bootstrapping device to permit the
assertion of a defense or claim that could nowhere else be brought.
Thus, far from their usual functions of serving to prevent fragmented
litigation in several different forums, application of the doctrines of an-
cillary or pendent jurisdiction to permit the assertion of the limitation
defense to a federal court civil action after expiration of the six month
period would serve to create a forum to determine that issue when no
other such forum then existed. That is a most unusual, if at all defensi-
ble, use of those doctrines.
While there is authority that would seem to indicate that the limita-
tion defense can be asserted in response to a non-maritime civil action
commenced in a federal district court,"2 that authority is somewhat
questionable in that it would make the ability to limit turn on the
somewhat fortuitous occurrence of the claimant commencing suit in a
maritime jurisdiction which is asserted after running of the six month period within which
a Complaint to Limit could be filed, however, is an entirely different matter. Far from
merely curing a technical defect, or compelling the owner-defendant to perform a rather
useless act, such a practice works to resurrect a defense that could not otherwise be raised
to the civil action and which could not then be timely asserted in a separate limitation
proceeding. And, in that manner, it works to "chill the right" of the plaintiff proceeding
under the Saving to Suitors Clause or a specific statutory entitlement (such as the Jones
Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976)) from the fully contemplated benefits of those provisions. It is
doubted that recourse to those provisions can permissibly be coupled with the waiver of a
jurisdictional defense. In short, if the Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. case is correctly decided,
it should at least place in doubt those decisions permitting the assertion of an untimely
limitation defense to an action properly reposing in a federal district court pursuant to
that court's civil, non-maritime, jurisdiction. While such a result can be attacked on prac-
tical and conceptual grounds, it would appear that precisely the same grounds of attack
exist in cases where the answer is asserted to a state court action.
122. To the extent a maintenance and cure claim is not limitable, however, that basis
for justifying Murray would fail. For indication that a maintenance and cure claim is not
subject to limitation, see In re Tiedman, 236 F. Supp. 895 (D. Del. 1964), rev'd on pro-
cedural grounds, 367 F.2d 498 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 932 (1967); Murray v.
New York Cent. R.R., 171 F. Supp. 80 (S.D.N.Y.), affd without discussion of that point,
287 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 945 (1961).
123. See note 109 supra.
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federal court; or, if he commences suit in a state court, upon that ac-
tion being one that can be removed to the civil side of the federal
district court.124 Thus, a Jones Act claimant who desires to prevent the
limitation defense would be in a more secure position than one posses-
sing a non-statutory maritime claim against a defendant of diverse
citzenship.11 The ability to assert so significant a defense should not
turn upon the plaintiff's selection of forum, the nature of his claim, and
whether there exists or does not exist a basis for removal. Yet, that is
precisely what may be the case if Murray v. New York Central
Railroad128 and its progeny are interpreted broadly and Cincinnati Gas
& Electric Co. v. Abel" is applied narrowly.
The unfairness of a system that premises the most significant right
to limit once the time to petition has expired on the vagaries of where
the case ultimately ends, is further emphasized by the fact that often a
plaintiff will have to go to extreme expense and inconvenience in suing
a distant vessel owner, and might find it most expedient to use the
maritime in rem or quasi in rem procedures. Yet, if he does so, he will
virtually assure that a lately-discovered limitation defense can be
asserted, whereas commencement of the action in some other forum
would obviate if not completely eliminate that risk.1"
124. It is clear that a non-Jones Act maritime action commenced in a state court pur-
suant to the Savings Clause can be removed to the federal district court if diversity ex-
ists. Similarly, it is clear that removal cannot be premised on the contention that the
"saved" cause is within the federal district court's admiralty jurisdiction. See Romero v.
International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959); Giacona v. Capricorn Shipping
Co., 394 F. Supp. 1189 (S.D. Tex. 1975).
Removal of Jones Act cases is specifically precluded by the provisions of the Federal
Employer's Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1976), which are incorporated into the Jones
Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976). Thus, limitation by answer could always be prevented by a
Jones Act claimant by exercising his right to commence the action after running of the
six month period in a state court.
It is questionable whether the availability of removal should have so dramatic and
direct an impact on the substantive right to recover damages. It is significant that the
ability to remove results in no comparable consequences in any other area.
125. See note 124 supra.
126. 287 F.2d 152 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 945 (1961); see text accompanying
notes 117-122 supra.
127. 533 F.2d 1001 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 858 (1976); see text accompanying
notes 110-112 supra.
128. It seems reasonably clear that a limitation defense can be asserted to an action
within the admiralty jurisdiction of a federal district court after running of the six month
period following receipt of written notice of a limitable claim. See Deep Sea Tankers, Ltd.
v. The Long Branch, 258 F.2d 757 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 933 (1959); The
Chickie, 141 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1944), and the numerous subsequent decisions that have un-
questionably applied both those decisions. But see the curious dictum in The Bremen v.
Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972), discussed at note 116 supra. Thus, one commenc-
ing an in rem or quasi in rem proceeding can in no way prevent assertion of a Umitation
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Common sense indicates that if the right to limit by way of answer
is to continue as a viable alternative to the filing of a limitation peti-
tion, it should exist in any forum where the claimant is empowered to
commence suit." And, if the forum selected by the claimant is jurisdic-
tionally barred from resolving that issue, there should exist a
mechanism for transferring or removing that issue to the appropriate
forum. Yet, that does not appear to be the present status of the law."a
The authorities upon which rests the emasculation of the right to effec-
defense. Usually, however, one possessing an in rem or quasi in rem claim can also sue in
personam in a state court or, if there exists an independent basis of federal jurisdiction, in
a federal district court. Commencement of an action in a state court will, if the Cincinnati
Gas & Elec. Co. decision is followed, prevent assertion of the limitation defense if
challenged; and, arguably, that defense may also be ineffective if the in personam suit is
commenced as a non-maritime civil action in a federal district court. See note 120 supra.
Thus, the possessor of a potentially limitable claim may have to forego recourse to other-
wise available maritime procedures to prevent the incautious vessel owner from having
yet another opportunity to limit his liability. Where recourse to such procedures is
economically compelled-as may be the case with a distant vessel owner and an im-
pecunious claimant-circumstances that should play no role in the outcome will determine
whether the ability to limit yet exists. It seems manifestly unfair that the claimant's abil-
ity to prevent assertion of the limitation defense should turn on his ability to finance dis-
tant litigation.
129. In fact, the right to assert the limitation defense does exist in any forum, state or
federal, in which the plaintiff may commence his action. However, since the state courts,
and arguably even the federal district courts exercising their civil jurisdiction pursuant to
the Savings Clause, lack the ability to resolve the limitation issue if challenged or to
somehow certify or transfer that issue to a federal district court exercising its admiralty
jurisdiction, that right can be rendered meaningless by the simple expedient of the claim-
ant asserting that the vessel owner has no right to limit.
There is no discussion in the cases as to whether a challenge to the right to limit that is
either patently frivolous, or which is made to appear frivolous after completion of
discovery, can be stricken by the non-admiralty court. If the issue of frivolty can only be
determined by the admiralty and there is no mechanism for getting that issue before such
a court, frivolous challenges to limitation defenses would be legally encouraged. Thus, it
may well be that only challenges to the right to limit which have a sufficient basis in fact
to overcome a "frivolous" assertion will work to destroy the owner's limitation defense,
and that the state courts are empowered to make that threshold determination.
130. For authority that there exists no mechanism for having the right to limit issue
raised in a state court heard by the federal district court, see Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co.
v. Abel, 533 F.2d 1001 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 429 U.S. 858 (1976); Ohio River Co. v. City of
Wheeling, 225 F. Supp. 733 (N.D.W. Va. 1964). No post-1936 case has even suggested that
such a mechanism exists, and in the pre-1936 cases the limitation issue arising out of an
action pending in a state court was always resolved in a limitation proceeding commenced
in a federal district court. However, prior to the 1936 amendments to the Limitation Act,
that petition could be filed at any time-laches being the only bar deemed to apply-and
there was no need that it be filed within six months following receipt in writing of a
limitable claim. Of course, if the six month period has not passed, a vessel owner sued in a
state court whose limitation defense is challenged can still file a Complaint to Limit
Liability in the federal district court and, in that manner, preserve the right to limit if
that court finds the vessel owner is entitled to that defense.
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tively assert limitation as a defense to the claimant's state court com-
plaint, however, are most suspect.
It is clear that the limitation defense can be asserted in those courts
which have been deemed powerless to resolve that issue. Moreover,
those non-maritime courts can decide all issues pertaining to the limita-
tion defense except whether the defense is in fact available-ie.,
whether the owner's knowledge is sufficient to make him fully account-
able for the claimant's damage. Thus, if the right to limit is not con-
tested, the state court having jurisdiction over the claim can establish
the value of the vessel for limitation purposes and apply the substan-
tive limitation principle by reducing any judgment that might be ob-
tained to that value. 1 It is, to say the least, unusual for a court to be
131. That the state court is empowered to determine "whether the defendant [vessel
owner] is liable at all, and, if so ... the value of the vessel and her freight, which is the
limit of the defendant's liability" is clear. Langnes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531, 544 (1931).
While the state court's power to determine the validity of the plaintiff's claim is un-
doubtedly derived from the Saving to Suitors Clause, the source of its power to place a
value on the vessel is less clear. And, it is probable that the source of that latter power is
derived from the same statutory source which provides to the vessel owner the right to
limit liability. Thus, Langnes v. Green and its progeny apparently find somewhere in the
Limitation Act a division of jurisdiction between state and federal courts that is nowhere
articulated, either in the Act itself or in the judicial interpretations of the Act. It is
arguable that the power to place a value on the vessel is ancillary to the power to resolve
the validity of the claim. However, if that is so, it would seem to follow that the state
courts should also have ancillary jurisdiction, or perhaps even pendent jurisdiction, over
the right to limit issue. That seems especially true since the same facts relevant to the
right of the claimant to recover may play a role in determination of the knowledge or
privity so critical in determining whether the vessel owner has the right to limit, and
bifurcation of those issues could raise difficult problems of collateral estoppel, if not res
judicata. It is conceivable that the jurisdictional division results from the belief that the
issue of the right to limit is of such critical importance to the desired uniformity of ad-
miralty law that it should be determined only by an admiralty court. However, most other
issues deemed of such interest to the admiralty can be tried by state courts, who are com-
pelled to apply federal maritime law to such issues, and it is not immediately clear why
the right to limit issue should be afforded any greater protection.
In sum, neither precedent, logic, nor statutory language provide a clear and reasoned
basis for the division of jurisdiction articulated in Langnes v. Green, and, it is suspected,
the rationale for that division is at best suspect.
It is not clear whether a vessel owner who asserts limitation as a defense to a state
court action and, before running of the six month period, files a Complaint to Limit
Liability in a federal district court, can insist that the state court refrain from placing a
value on the vessel. If the vessel owner amends his pleading to strike the affirmative
limitation defense, it seems clear that valuation will be accomplished in the Limitation
Proceeding. If he fails to do that, however, there would seem to be no bar to that function
being performed by the state court, which is apparently competent to fulfill that function.
But see Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. Abel, 533 F.2d at 1005, where the court said: "the
fact remains that the state court lost jurisdiction of the limitation of liability issue when
the claimant contested the owner's right to avail itself of limitation .... Id. (emphasis
added). If value is first determined in the Limitation Proceeding for purposes of ascertain-
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clothed with only partial jurisdiction of a substantive legal area; and
even more unusual to conclude that a court's jurisdiction can be made
to turn upon the claimant's response to an asserted defense. The fact
that the right to limit is uncontroverted should not work to clothe a
court lacking jurisdiction with the ability to perform the above tasks,
since the parties cannot "stipulate" or otherwise by their actions con-
fer jurisdiction upon a tribunal that has not been granted that jurisdic-
tion by the appropriate legislative or constitutional grant.'32 Thus,
there seems to be no sound foundation for concluding that only a part
of the limitation jurisdiction reposes outside the admiralty, and the re-
mainder is exclusively the province of the admiralty.
If Congress has the power to grant to the state courts jurisdiction
to resolve the right to limit question-which might in fact be the case
if the older Supreme Court decisions are inaccurate or if they be con-
strued only as interpreting the then extant legislative restrictions-it
is more logical to conclude either that Congress in fact conferred that
right on the state courts as a part of the 1936 amendments; or that it
took away entirely the rights of such courts to entertain that limita-
tion defense. The decisions interpreting the 1936 amendments could
find no intent on the part of Congress to have taken away from a
defendant the right to commence limitation proceedings by way of
answer to a complaint filed outside the admiralty jurisdiction.'33 Thus,
unless the 1936 amendments.were intended to create a trap for the un-
wary vessel owner or to create a hollow "right" frequently incapable of
effectuation, state courts must be deemed to have been given the
power to resolve the right to limit issue when raised in a forum where
limitation can properly be asserted. Although no clear indication of
such an intent is found in the Act or in the legislative history, neither
is there to be found any indication that Congress intended to
emasculate a right that had long been available to vessel owners.
Left to their own devices, the courts have created a totally un-
workable "solution" that, in large practical effect, has emasculated the
ability of a ship owner to rely upon the right to limit by way of answer
and compels the filing of what would otherwise be unnecessary Com-
plaints to Limit Liability." Moreover, the present status of the law en-
ing the amount of the bond that must be posted, however, it would appear that the
federal court's determination would be binding upon the parties in the state court action.
The fact that this issue need even be addressed here points out the difficulties inherent in
a system which encourages, if it does not compel, resolution of the cause in two separate
judicial proceedings.
132. See Cooper v. Allison, 243 Or. 179, 412 P.2d 356 (1966).
133. See Deep Sea Tankers, Ltd. v. The Long Branch, 258 F.2d 757 (2d Cir. 1958), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 933 (1959); The Chickie, 141 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1944).
134. The complaints would be "unnecessary" in that the benefits of concursus are not
available in single claim cases or in situations where the totality of the claims does not ex-
ceed the value of the vessel.
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courages claimants to delay bringing suit in single claim situations and
to contest the vessel owner's assertion of the right to limit even where
no plausible basis for such a contention exists. And, unless the claim-
ant following this procedure negligently asserts his claim in the wrong
forum, or is compelled to do so because of economic necessity, he will
be able to prevent assertion of a defense that the Supreme Court has
long made clear permissibly exists. If in fact the right to limit by
answer is yet available, the ability to make use of that right should not
turn upon the vagaries of the claimant's negligence or economic com-
pulsion.
The present practice has forced the prudent vessel owner to file
Limitation Complaints in situations where they should be totally un-
necessary, and has virtually eliminated the ability to assert limitation
of liability by answer as a viable alternative to all but the most in-
cautious of vessel owners. The practice should, thus, be eliminated or
it should be made clear that some courts-either state or federal-can
resolve the limitation issue, regardless of where and how raised. While
the present practice may be a boon to lawyers, it serves no useful pur-
pose to vessel owners, claimants, or the already overburdened state
and federal courts.
For the incautious vessel owner who, ignoring the previously
discussed pitfalls, relies upon the ability to assert limitation by way of
defense, one additional problem may arise. If there are multiple
claimants, will his total exposure equal the value of the vessel and its
pending freight as to each claim that is asserted against him, or will all
claimants against whom such a defense can be asserted be compelled
to share pro-rata a sum which cannot exceed the vessel's value?
In The West Point, ' where separate suits by claimants were com-
menced in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia, the court concluded that each claimant could recover damages
up to the value of the offending vessel. There, the court said:
Undoubtedly limitation of liability may be pleaded by answer alone....
But if there is more than one claim, then the defendant-owner can confine
his aggregate liability on all the claims to the single value of the vessel ...
only by the petition prescribed by the statute .... If he does not follow
the procedural steps of the statute, but uses the answer to raise such
defense, the owner may be held personally liable on each claim to the ex-
tent of the value of his ship .... 131
135. 83 F. Supp. 680 (E.D. Va. 1949).
136. Id. at 681 (citation omitted). A case that is sometimes cited as authority for The
West Point proposition is American Tobacco Co. v. The Katingo Hadjipatera, 211 F.2d
666 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 828 (1954). That the case is not direct authority for
that proposition, however, is made clear in Blunk v. Wilson Line of Washington, Inc., 341
F. Supp. 1345 (N.D. Ohio 1972), where the court stated:
While the court in American Tobacco speaks of a concourse of claimants as the only
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The court did not think this outcome could be altered by consolidation
of the separate claims for trial expediency, nor by the fact that the
claims were asserted within the court's admiralty jurisdiction.137
A contrary result was reached by the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Ohio in Blunk v. Wilson Line of
Washington, Inc., where the vessel owner filed a single answer con-
taining the limitation defense to forty separate actions commenced by
passengers injured when the defendant's vessel ran aground in a fog
bank. There, relying largely upon The Scotland,139 the district court re-
jected the holding of The West Point and effectuated a non-statutory
type of concursus.
The Scotland does provide that the Limitation Act contains two
alternative paths toward achievement of its benefits and that:
If they [the vessel owner] failed to avail themselves of the latter [filing a
petition to limit] they are still entitled to the benefit of the former kind of
relief. The primary enactment ... is that the liability of the owner for any
way a vessel owner may secure immunity, the immunity referred to is from defend-
ing multiple claims in different courts. Although stating that "as a practical matter
the choice to defend in multiple-claim situations by means of a petition for exonera-
tion or limitation may be the only sensible one," the court recognized that 46 U.S.C.
§ 185 is an extension of 46 U.S.C. § 183.... There is nothing in the opinion which
would indicate that the substantive rights accorded a vessel owner differ whether
he chooses to proceed under Section 185 or Section 183.
Id. at 1347 n.1 (citation omitted).
137. The West Point dealt with two separate suits commenced within the court's ad-
miralty jurisdiction and which were consolidated for trial. Neither fact, quite obviously,
was deemed sufficient to limit the owner's total exposure to the after the occurrence
value of the vessel.
138. 341 F. Supp. 1345 (N.D. Ohio 1972). See also Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. Barge W-701,
468 F. Supp. 802 (E.D. La. 1979). There, the defendant vessel owner pleaded the limitation
defense by way of separate answers to both the main demand of the plaintiff and cross-
claims of other defendants. The action was pending in the district court pursuant to its
admiralty jurisdiction. In dispensing with the contention that pleading limitation in
separate answers created multiple limitation funds, the court rejected The West Point,
stating:
The decision in The West Point was reached with only a cursory analysis, at
best, of the Limitation Act, and did not resurface in reported decisions for nearly
twenty-five years. After a much more thorough review of both the Act and its
legislative history, the multiple fund result of The West Point was soundly rejected
in the 1972 decision of Blunk v. Wilson Line of Washington, Inc.... The Blunk
court rejected the argument after a thorough analysis of the Limitation Act, feeling
that such an interpretation would render 46 U.S.C. 183 meaningless. This court
agrees, and therefore holds that should limitation be granted here, there will be
only one limitation fund for both the cross-claims and the main demand.
468 F. Supp. at 814 (citation and footnote omitted). For additional critical commentary on
The West Point, see Volk & Cobb, Limitation of Liability, 51 TUL. L. REv. 953, 977-78
(1977).
139. 105 U.S. 24 (1881).
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loss or damage without his privity or knowledge, shall in no case exceed
the amount or value of his interest in the vessel and her freight, then pend-
ing.
140
However, The Scotland did not deal with claims asserted in separate
actions which were consolidated only for purposes of judicial expedi-
ency, but with a single in personam attachment in which the other
claimants voluntarily intervened. And, it further provided that:
If there are parties, not represented in the suit, who have claims for
damages, it is the respondents' fault for not bringing them in, as they
might have done after the Rules of 1871 were adopted, by pursuing the
remedy pointed out in those rules. But, as to the actual libelants and in-
terveners in the suit, there is no reason in the world, why the
respondents should not be decreed to pay the value of the ship's strip-
pings and remnants into court, nor why such amount should not be
distributed pro rata amongst the claimants."'
The last-quoted language strongly indicates, if it does not actually
state, that an incautious vessel owner who fails to petition for limita-
tion and then is sued separately by a number of claimants may have to
pay damages that exceed the after the occurrence value of the
vessel.' The issue, then, is whether the fortuitous fact that all such
suits are brought in-or can be removed or transferred to-the same
forum where they are consolidated for trial can extricate the vessel
owner from this dilemma of his own making.
The court in The West Point,"" without discussion of this issue,
thought not. The court in Blunk thought limitation as to all claimants
appropriate."'
It is probable that separate limitation funds will have to be
established for each claimant bringing a separate suit in different
jurisdictions, and for claimants who commence suit after resolution of
the initial suit in which the limitation defense is asserted.' And, if
140. Id. at 34 (citation omitted).
141. Id. at 35.
142. That would follow because the separate claimants would not be "represented in
the suit" of any other claimant against whom the limitation defense was asserted.
143. 83 F. Supp. 680 (E.D. Va. 1949).
144. 341 F. Supp. 1345 (N.D. Ohio 1972); see note 136 supra. The Blunk court, while
noting that the defendant vessel owner admitted "that consolidation should not affect
substantive rights," and that resolution of the question before it compelled resolution of
both a procedural and a substantive issue, permitted consolidation to achieve a type of
concursus. 341 F. Supp. at 1346. There is no clear indication in the opinion as to how it
reached that conclusion other than its reliance on The Scotland's statement that either
road to limitation should set as a ceiling to the owner's liability the after the occurrence
value of the vessel.
145. This conclusion is buttressed by the obvious fact that in such situations there ex-
ists no possible basis for effectuating a concursus-and no court would have jurisdiction
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that is so, the consolidation procedure set forth in Rule 42 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would effectuate a drastic change in
the substantive rights of both the vessel owner and the various
claimants. There is no indication that consolidation was intended to, or
could permissibly, effectuate so drastic a change in substantive
rights."'
While it might seem extremely doctrinaire to distinguish between in
rem cases where claimants are compelled to intervene or lose any
rights they might otherwise have against an arrested or attached res,
and cases in which they are procedurally thrown together by virtue of
a rule intended to further the aims of judicial economy, there is little
doubt that the situations are in fact different and that it is more
plausible to treat the former causes as single cases than the latter.
Moreover, while the in rem or quasi in rem claimant has the alter-
native option of seeking relief against only the vessel owner in per-
sonam,1 4 7 and thus not being tarred with the limitation brush in a case
like The Scotland, no such alternative may be as readily available to
the injured party who is forced into the same law suit by virtue of a
motion to consolidate.1 4 1
There is no doubt that a vessel owner who desires to limit his total
liability to the after the occurrence value of his vessel can accomplish
that goal by filing a Complaint to Limit Liability within six months
after receiving written notice of claim. There is considerable doubt,
Blunk notwithstanding, whether that end can be achieved by a vessel
owner against whom multiple claims are asserted and who relies in-
stead on the ability to assert the limitation defense by way of answer.
If the claimants commence their separate actions in different jurisdic-
tions and there is no way of getting them into the same forum where
they can be consolidated for trial, Blunk gives no indication of how a
non-section 185 concursus can be effectuated, and in all probability no
such procedure exists. And, even if consolidation can be achieved, per-
over a single fund and over the various claimants. These claimants, not in the suit, seem
to be the precise parties to whom the Court adverted in The Scotland, 105 U.S. at 35; see
text accompanying note 141 supra.
146. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976) which, in describing the Supreme Court's authority to
promulgate rules of civil procedure, specifically provides that: "Such rules shall not
abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right and shall preserve the right of trial by
jury .... "
147. Most possessors of maritime liens who could intervene in in rem actions also are
possessed of in personam rights against the owners of the subject res, and could institute
separate in personam actions against such owners. Thus, they would not be part of the
same "case" and thus outside the scope of The West Point decision.
148. Filing a separate action may not prevent consolidation, even if commenced in a
different court. Removal and transfer may eventually bring all such causes into the same
court and, at that time, consolidation may be effectuated.
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mitting it to provide the basis for a concursus-as did the court in
Blunk - transcends any function a procedural rule is normally permit-
ted to effectuate.
Thus, while on the surface Blunk seems an appealing solution to the
problem, it is doubtful whether its approach can work in all cases
where answers will have to be asserted against separate claimants
and, even where all actions are in the same court, its reasoning breaks
down when balanced against the Rules Enabling Act. Thus, cautious
vessel owners in cases where there are potential multiple claimants
and, as a consequence, where concursus is desirable, should never rely
upon the right to limit by way of answer.
It is clear that a vessel owner who desires to plead limitation of
liability as a defense to an action commenced against him, but who
fails to assert that defense in his initial answer, may amend his answer
to include the limitation defense. There is authority that permission to
amend to assert such a defense should be refused "only under the most
exigent circumstances."'49 However, courts have refused to permit
amendment where the delay was lengthy, could prejudice the plaintiff,
and was not otherwise justified.10 Since the six month period within
which the limitation complaint must be filed does not apply to asser-
tions of a limitation defense, that period plays no role in the deter-
mination of whether amendment should be precluded because of the
vessel owner's laches.
149. Baham v. Atlantic, Gulf & Pac. Co., 333 F. Supp. 680 (E.D. Pa. 1971). The court
there said:
We are ... impressed by the strong declaration of 46 U.S.C. § 183(a) that "[T]he
liability of the owner of any vessel *** shall not *** exceed the amount or value of
the interest of such owner in such vessel, and her freight then pending." While we
do not conclude from this language that the Courts must always grant a vessel
owner leave to amend his answer to raise a limitation of liability defense, we
believe that they should refuse to do so only under the most exigent circumstances.
Id. at 681. In Baham the answer was filed on May 27, 1969, and leave to amend was
sought on October 29, 1969. The case had not yet been placed on the trial list and, as a
result of discovery proceedings, the plaintiff had been made aware of the possibility of a
limitation defense.
That the six month period within which a Complaint to Limit Liability has no bearing
on the time within which an amendment asserting the limitation defense can be granted is
reasonably clear. See Cantey v. McLain Line, Inc., 40 F. Supp. 887 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd per
curiam, 312 U.S. 167 (1941). But see Yates v. Dann, 167 F. Supp. 882 (D. Del. 1958), where
the court stated, "A sensible result would require the shipowner who attempts to set up
the defense of limitation of liability by answer after six months from receipt of notice of
claim to show good cause for his delay." Id. at 884.
150. See Yates v. Dann, 167 F. Supp. 882 (D. Del. 1958), where permission to amend an
answer to assert a limitation defense was denied when raised following the third trial and
some eleven years after the initial complaint had been filed. There the court said:
Even conceding that a shipowner may plead limitation of liability by answer
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IV. CONCLUSION
The Limitation Act, Supplemental Rule F, and case precedent make
clear that a vessel owner can seek to limit his liability either by filing
a Complaint to Limit or by asserting limitation as a defense to an ac-
tion commenced against him. If he chooses the first route, he must act
within six months of some event, although the triggering occurrence is
not entirely clear; and, if he chooses the latter route his goal will
become even more elusive. Thus, while the right to limit undoubtedly
exists, its implementation often involves considerable risk and may
ultimately depend upon how a particular court interprets both the ap-
plicable rule and case precedents. This confusion in effecutating the un-
doubted right to limit would have pleased Humpty Dumpty, who
boastfully asserted that: "'When I use a word ... it means just what I
choose it to mean-neither more nor less.""'15 Courts and drafters of
rules, however, should be more attuned to the views of Alice, who
questioned "'whether you can make words mean so many different
things.' ,12
The right to limit may indeed be an anachronism in this day of
readily available insurance coverage and the ability to cut losses
through use of the corporate form.' To the extent it yet exists,
however, its implementation should not be shrouded in uncertainty. It
is high time that vessel owners be put on clear notice of when, and
how, limitation may be safely and effectively asserted.
more than six months after receipt of notice of a claim for injuries, yet, the amend-
ment to Title 46 U.S.C.A. § 185, must be taken as indicating some intention on the
part of Congress to compel greater expedition on the part of shipowners in setting
up the defense .... To allow the two procedures [limitation by petition and by
answer] to exist side by side without some correlation between them would result
in a partial frustration of the amendment.
Id. at 884 (citations omitted). See also In re Conners Marine Co., 28 F. Supp. 585
(S.D.N.Y.), affd per curiam, 107 F.2d 1011 (2d Cir. 1939), refusing permission to amend
sought on the eve of trial and nearly a year and a half following commencement of the
suit; and Odegard v. E. Quist, Inc., 199 F. Supp. 449 (E.D.N.Y. 1961), where the court
stated:
Here the defendant moves for leave to amend its answer two years after it served
and filed its original answer and on the very eve of trial. To permit such an amend-
ment would be prejudicial to the plaintiff who had no reason to suspect that he
would have to go to trial on the issue of limitation of liability ....
Id. at 452.
151. L. CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS Chapter VI (1872).
152. Id. (emphasis added) Humpty Dumpty's classic response was "The question is ...
which is to be master-that's all. ' Apparently the courts have opted to follow Humpty's
lead!
153. See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 16, at 822-23.
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